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..._.. - -· 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MA~SFIELD (D., MONT.) 
BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 
JULY 25, 1973 
Mr. Chairman, 
I want to begin by thanking you for the invitation to address 
this Committee on the question of U.S. forces in Europe--as well 
as on the broader context in which we must place our consideration, 
the question of u.s. military forces around the world. 
The United States currently has stationed on foreign soil over 
11 
500,000 military personnel. In addition, over 100,000 military 
y 
personnel are afloat off foreign shores. Almost 30% of our 
military forces are stationed beyond our homeland. Not since the 
days of the British Empire or probably more truly, the Roman Empire, 
have so many been required to "maintain the peace" away from their 
* 
shores. 
I believe it is important to view the question in the broad 
context of U.S. forces stationed around the world. It has been 
painfully evident and generally agreed in the United States Senate 
for at least the last several years that the United States is badly 
_v. See Appendix A. 
~/. Ibid. 
* The percentage of u.s. forces stationed overseas was even 
higher during some years since World war II. 
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over-extended abroad. 
We must not forget the lesson of the tragic war in Vietnam; 
for that tragedy will only be compounded if we refuse to learn 
and guide our actions accordingly. 
The National Commitments Resolution passed overwhelmingly 
by the Senate was significant evidence of the prevailing sentiment 
ll 
in the Senate. The war Powers legislation passed overwhelmingly 
i/ 
by both Houses of Congress is another significant step. 
But these vital actions reform and refine our institutional 
mechanisms. They serve notice of the Congressional threshold 
of tolerance. They demonstrate a Congressional attitude that seeks 
a greater share of responsibility. But these constructive changes 
are not enough. We must accept the realization that our commit-
ments and policies are not always made in formal and traditional 
ways. In fact, some policies seem to "just happen." 
The presence of so many u.s. forces on foreign soil ~s such 
a policy. Their presence presumes a policy that heavily favors 
the military option. The War Powers legislation expresses 
ll- Congressional Record, Permanent Ed., June 25, 1969, p. 17245, 
9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 
4/. Congressional Record, July 18, 1973, p. H-6283; July 20, 
1973, p. S-14226, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 
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Congressional dissent to that emphasis. But the fundamental 
difficulty in discerning semblance to America's policy abroad is 
that the commitment and level of U.S. forces abroad has determined 
our policy rather ~han our policy determining the level of u.s. 
forces abroad. The intractability of executive branch attituJe 
on force levels abroad during the past 25 years can only be ex-
plained by the incapacity of the policy-makers to perceive that 
the troops on foreign soil was our policy and policy-makers were 
really articulating after-the-fact rationalizations. Members 
of the Executive Branch, whether in office for two weeks, two 
months, two years or two decades, have had the same theme, and 
it is always one that the world will fall if any of our soliders 
return home. 
But yearning to return horne shall become more compelling with 
each passing month. The impoundment by this Administration of 
$12 billion for domestic needs; the closing of many U.S. military 
bases as an economy measure, putting many Americans out of work; 
the devaluation of the dollar by more than 25% over the past 
two years; all will join in marshalling attention to what heretofore 
has been considered an issue that should be left to the "experts." 
I believe the arguments this year will be heard. 
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As I stated above, the plain fact is that the United States 
stations over 600,000 military forces outside the United States 
and its territories and possessions. We maintain over 2,000 
21 
bases and installations on foreign soil. There are over 314,000 
~ 
dependents stationed overseas accompanying these forces. The 
Defense Department employs directly or indirectly approximately 
173,000 foreign nationals at these bases overseas to support these 
21 
u.s. forces abroad. These are not reasons for bringing our 
troops home, but they are facts that should make America listen 
to the reasons. 
The most detailed focus can be obtained on Europe. At least 
in 1950 the Congress was asked to participate in that decision of 
sending troops to that Continent. But equally forceful questbns 
can be raised as well to the u.s. troop commitments in Thailand--
now about 45,000: or in Okinawa, about 40,000; or Korea, about 
42,000; or Taiwan, about 8,000; or the Philippines, about 15,000; 
or Japan, about 18,000; or even Bermuda where about 1,000 men defend 
8/ 
our national interests. 
2/. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Installations and Logistics, Sept, 16, 1972. 
6/. See Appendix B. 
21. See Appendix c. 
8/. See Appendix A. 
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Let us look at Europe when NATO was first structured. Let 
us look at the realities that faced this Nation at that time 
which precipitated the commitment of four divisions to Europe. 
Let us look at the premises upon which the Congress assented to 
this commitment of these divisions and the representations that were 
made at that time about the permanence of such a commitment of 
manpower abroad. Then let us look at Europe and the U.S. today, 
28 years after the War, 23 years after the initial stationing 
of these divisions to NATO 
EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II 
World War II left Western Europe in ruins. The general 
view in the West was that the communist monolith under Stalin had 
the domination of the entire planet as its goal. The United States 
moved swiftly with the most massive reconstruction effort ever 
attempted with its Marshall Plan--an effort that has proven 
successful beyond expectations. The institutions of Europe, 
political, economic as well as military, were in shambles. With 
these weakened conditions in Europe combined with the common 
~/ 
perception of the threat of the hordes from the East a 
~/. Adam Ulan, Expansion and coexistence (New York, 1968) pp.414-415. 
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strong military presence in Western Europe to compliment the 
economic effort was rational. But the North Atlantic Treaty 
itself did not commit U.S. troops to the European continent for 
deterrence. In fact, the treaty itself made no commitment of 
U.S. ground troops to Europe. It was not until 1951 that the 
decision was made to send four land divisions to Europe and 
Congressional assent solicited to this significant commitment of 
troops. 
The history of proceedings before the Congress are very 
revealing. 
Secretary Marshall claimed at that time that there was nothing 
magical about four divisions. The full level was selected based 
upon a judgment of our resources and their availability. If only 
the same standard were to be applied today. And why should it 
~/ 
not be applied? 
But even more revealing ls the exchange that Senator 
JQ/. SENATOR GILLETTE. Just one additional question. There is 
no magic formula in the four plus two divisions, as I understand it? 
SECRETARY MARSHALL. It is just a combination of considerations 
that we have had to turn over in our minds. 
SENATOR GILLETTE. Taking into consideration a number of factors, 
the immediate availability of troops and the fact that we want to 
make, in our opinion, a move, take a course that will give some 
reassurance to our allies that we are taking into consideration our 
resources and their availability, the formula of £our plus two was 
reached? 
SECRETARY MARSHALL. Yes, sir. 
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Hickenlooper had with Secretary Acheson when it was made clear by 
Secretary Acheson that the original NATO Treaty envisioned no 
troops stationed in Europe by the United States and that it was 
clear that each signatory to the NATO Treaty would unilaterally 
make its own determination of its contribution of military equip-
D./ 
ment, manpower and facilities. In addition, Secretary Acheson 
lQI, cont'd. from page 6. 
SENATOR GILLETTE. And there is nothing magic about it? 
SECRETARY MARSHALL. No, certainly not .... 
Hearings on "Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to 
Duty in the European Area, " February, 1951, Committee on Foreign 
Relations and Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 82nd 
Congress, lst Sess i on. 
11/. SENATOR HICKENLOOPER .... I do say to you that without any 
doubt in my mind, the North Atlantic Pact proposition was sold to a 
great many Members of the Congress on the idea that prior to ag-
gression we would not be called upon to implement the land armies 
of Western Europe by large numbers of troops .... 
Now, may I ask you, has the policy changed, or is this a 
new proposition? Has your position changed? Apparently it has, but 
I would like to have you comment on it. 
SECRETARY ACHESON. I shall be glad to comment on what you 
have just stated. 
The question which you asked me was understood by me as it has 
just been understood by Senator Smith, and that was whether, under 
article 3 of the treaty, we were expected, in the sense of were we 
undertaking a commitment, to send ground troops to Europe. I re-
plied to you that the answer to that is a clear and absolute "no." 
we were not undertaking a commitment by article 3 of that treaty to 
do anything except to work with our allies to establish individual 
and collective defense. 
I think it was clearly understood that way by the committee, 
which you will remember, and I should like to recall to you that 
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envisioned the return of troops subsequently sent if the situation 
got better. 
But what conditions were envisioned in 1951 that initially 
11/, cont.d from page 7 . 
that committee, in its report, said, under this article 3 : 
Realistic assessment of the defensive capacity 
necessary to resis t aru1ed aLtack will be a function of 
the organization to be established under article 9. 
And it goes on: 
On the basis o f this assessment, each party would determine 
for itself what it could most effectively contribute in 
the foru1 of facilities , m1l1tary equipment, production 
capacity, manpower, etc . This decision would be taken in 
the light of the resources and geographical location of 
the indiv1dua l state , and wlth due regard to its economic 
stability. There is no specif1c obligation as to the timing, 
nature, and extent of assistance to be given by any party. 
That is exactly in accordance with my understanding then and now, 
and that was what I thought was being asked, and to that I was 
responding. 
SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I am trying to find out whether this lS 
only the camel gettinJ its head under the tent, and whether the 
4 divisions will require 6 more and then the 10 will require 12 more, 
and where we are going, what we have to look forward to? In view 
of the fact that we did not contemplate sending any substantial 
numbers of ground troops to implement the North Atlantic Treaty, 
and now the scenes have shifted and we are being edged in, not by 
the back door but by the front door, with divisions of troops 
which at llist I did not contemplate we were going to send or intended 
to send, I am wondering where the end of this matter is. In the 
long run will we be put into the inevitable position of assuming 
the primary responsibility for the land defense of Europe. I am 
concerned as to whether or not we are going to get ourselves in 
that position by this piecemeal attrition method, or whether our 
commitments on land fo rces at the moment meet our reasonable 
obligations under the defense program as it is now contemplated. 
SECRETARY ACHESON. Senator, I think you are asking me quite 
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warranted the troops to go to Europe and what thorny questions 
should be resolved for us to expect their return. Senator Smith 
of New Jersey sought this informat1on from General Bradley 1n 
1951 and General Bradley felt tho making of a peace treaty with 
Germany and the state ~f preparednes s of the other nations of 
Europe as well as the aggress1ve 1ntentions of the East were the 
w 
chief irritants that Justifi ed U. S. action. 
111, cont'd. from page 8 . 
impossible questions. I do not know. In the first place, you say, 
Are we going to be asked to take over the land defense of Europe? 
The answer is, of course , we are not going to be asked to take 
over the defense, t he land defense of Europe. If you ask me whether 
in the future we may be asked to send more than six divisions, how 
can I possibly answer that? I suppose if there is war you w1ll. 
Maybe if the situation gets better it will be less. Maybe if it 
stays the same it will be the same. Maybe if it gets more tense, 
there may be some additions to it. 2£· cit. 
~/. SENATOR SMITH(N.J.). Now , the immediate question I want to 
ask you is this: Are we building up this European Army by putting 
our divisions there a t t he moment , in order to deter an aggression 
while they are getting their strength built up. Will the time come 
when they will be able to defend themselves entirely without our 
aid so far as Europe is concerned? 
In other words, can we look upon this as a gradually reducing 
contribution to the European Army of our United States forces, as 
we did on the Marshall plan from an economic standpoint? We started 
substantially and reduced until we do not have to give any more. 
Now, is our support, ground support, of a Wes~ern European 
army on the same principle? Is it on the principle of giving them 
strength and giving them courage to go ahead and set up their force, 
but as they get their own strength we will gradually withdraw from 
there and keep our forces mobile for any part of the world where 
they may strike? 
GENERAL BRADLEY. I think the question of whether a military 
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These were all val i d conce rns in 1951 . I n add i tion, lt was a 
time wh e n the Ko r e a n War was und erway; China was an active enemy ; 
the Sov j ets had come of nuc l ear age; the South East European f l ank 
was still threatened; the economies of Western Europe were Just back 
on their feet; politica l instability was p r eva l ent in most West 
European count r ies . Strong men replaced strong institutions and 
ll/ , cont'd. from page 9 . 
contribution to Europe would be a decreasing one is almost an impos-
sible one to answer at this time. So much depends upon the making 
of a peace treaty with Germany and the state of preparedness of the 
other nations , the continued aggressive moves on the part of other 
nations that are presently opposed to us, and their ideology. I 
think, Senator Smith, that is. a rather long-range questlon to whlch 
any answer at this time would not be worth much . 
SENATOR SMITH(N . J.). The only reason I asked you the quest1on 
is because I understood in talking with General Eisenhower that he 
thought we might think in terms of an approach similar to the 
Marshall plan from an economic standpolnt: that what we are 
trying to do now is trying to put spirit into the European natlons 
that may be fearful that we are not giving them support . They need 
it now more than they will a little later . 
GENERAL BRADLEY. I think that is true. They need it possibly 
more now. And, if you can look far enough ahead to the time when 
France has 50 or 60 divisions and those other countries have similar 
size forces , the time might arrive when we cou l d withdraw our forces 
altogether , and certainly when you get a peace treaty with Germany 
you are going to be faced with the question of reduction of forces, 
because some of these people are on occupation duties now; but that 
apparently is sometime in the future , and I would prefer not to try 
to answer your question, which in my opinion is based on conditions 
which are going to exist a considerable time in the future , and 
I can perceive of circumstances being possible which would permit 
us to withdraw entirely , but I say that is certainly going to be 
sometime off . QE. cit. 
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provided the cohcslon f~r Western Europe . But even then the 
questions were raised: Should the U. S . commit Lour d i v i sions to 
Europe as a deterrent lo another European war at least unt1l 
Europe ls ready ~o assume its own def~nses . 
'l'he Congress a s sented to that reques· .. and *-~1e Arrer i can troops 
returned to Europe to meet the Lhru~c that was perceived at that 
time . However real the tilrc..at ther. , has it chunged since that time? 
EUROPE SINCE TIIE ' SO's 
When U.S. troops \·;ere initi a lly commicted to the Eu r opean 
continen t , total GNP of all European NATO countries was $46 . 9 
l]_/ 
billion c:ompa red to 5831.9 billion for 1972 . The era of 
confronta t ion was hlgh and the national inscitutions we r e weak . 
Inte r relationships were virtually non-existent . Let us look at 
and contrast the economic exchange: 
1951 1972 
U. S . imports from l!SSR- -------------- - -$27 . 4million $ 95 . 5million 
U. S . exports to USSR---------------- - -- O. lmillion 546 . 7mi llion 
U. S . imports from Eastern Europe - - ----- 63 . 8m i llio n 
U. S . exports to Eastern Europe 2 . 8million 
320 . lmil lion 
818 . 2ml llion 
The total exports from all NATO countries to the USSR and 
Eastern Europe ln 197L amounted to $9 . 89 billion. The imports 
from the USSR and Eastern Europe to NATO countries totaled 
14/ 
$8 . 67 bi l lion . In t:his one area alon e of trade between the blocs , 
lll · See Appendix D 
1·4 / . I b i d . 
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the most dramatic change in climate must be recosnized. 
But even more significant than evaluating not only the 
strength of Western Europe and appreciating the strong trade 
flow between East and West lS the gr~at number of events s1nce 
1963 that manifest as well as signiflcantly contrlbutc to the 
lessening of tensions between East and West . I have selected 
1:2/ 
eighty-two events I cons1der si~nificant since 1963. They 
range from the hot line to the Nuclear Test Ban to the Consular 
Convention to the Non-prollferatiL· n Treaty to the treat·y nonnalizins 
15/. EVENTS FROM 1963 TO 1973 WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED TO 
THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: 
1. Renewal of Franco-Soviet trade agreement . Ft:bruary 1963. 
2. U.S.-USSR agreement to establish an emergency communica-
tions line (hot llne). June 1963. 
3. Tripartite treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. October 1963. 
4. Approval by President Kennedy of U.S. wheat sales to the 
USSR. October 1963. 
5. U.S.-USSR agreement of exch~ges in the scientific, 
technical, educational, cultural, and other fields. February 1964 . 
6. U.S. restores MFN treatment to Yugoslavia and Poland. 
March 1964. 
7. Renewal of U.S.-USSR trade agreement. April 1964. 
8 . U.S. Romanian trade discuss1ons. May 1964. 
9. U.S.-USSR consular agreement. Signed June 1964. Ratl-
fied March 1967. 
10. French-Soviet trade agreement. September 1964. 
11. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation in desalination of 
sea water. November 1964. 
12. Warsaw Pact Political Constulative Committee approval 
of the Rapacki suggestion for a conference on European security. 
January 1965. 
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relations between Ge1~any and Poland; to the Sovlet-West German 
agreement on consulates; to the German treaties with Soviet Union; 
to the SALT treaty; to the s1gning of the treaty on relations 
between East and West Germany. But to many the threat of an all-
out conventional war with the hordes from the East remains the same. 
Rigidity affects not only the rhetoric but the policy . General 
Eisenhower testifying in 1951 about Congressional responsib1lity 
in the determination and the evolution of the level of U.S. troops 
121, cont'd. from page 12 
13 . Franco-Soviet color television 
14. Italo-Soviet agreement on joint 
uses of atomic energy. October 1965. 
15. U.S.-USSR consular convention . 
16 . Italo-Soviet cultural agreement. 
agreement. March 1965 . 
cooperation in peaceful 
December 1965. 
February 1966. 
17. Italo-Soviet economic, scientific, and technical 
cooperation agreement. April 1966. 
18. Yugoslavia becomes full contracting party to GATT . April 1966 . 
19. De Gaulle's visit to the USSR . June 1966 . 
20. Franco-Soviet space resear~h agreement. June 1966. 
21. Franco-Soviet scientific, technical , and economic 
agreement . June 1966. 
22. Fiat-Soviet agreement for construction of a Fiat factory 
in Russia. August 1966. 
23 . Renault and Peugeot agreements with the USSR ~egarding 
cooperation with Soviet motor industry . October 1966. 
24. Kosygin's visit to France. December 1966. 
25. Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet permanent commlss1on. 
December 1966. 
27. Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet chamber of commerce. 
December 1966. 
28. North Atlantic Ministerial Council declaration emphasizing 
a willingness to explore ways of developing cooperation with the 
USSR and the states of Eastern Europe. December 1966 . 
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~n Europe said , 
I do think that Congress ought to see a respectable, 
reasonable approach, and the second they sec anythiny to 
be, let's say, cockeyed and crazy , to get into the thjny 
with both feet. ~/ 
Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the time has come when Congress 
must recognize that in the words of General Eisenhower , something 
l2f, cont'd. from page 13. 
29 . Franco-Sov~et atomic energy cooperation agreement. 
January 1967. 
30. Franco-Soviet trade agreement . January 1967 . 
31. Kosygin visit to the United Kingdom. February 1967 . 
32. Fanfani visit to Moscow. May 1967. 
33 . Italo-Soviet agreement on coope rat~on in tourism.May 1967. 
34. Italo-Soviet consular convention . May 1967 . 
35 . Poland becomes full contracting member of GATT . June 1967. 
36. U.K .-USSR establish London-Moscow teleprinter line. 
August 1967. 
37. Harmel Report of North Atlantic Council proposes discussion 
of mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. 
December 1967. 
38 . Announcement of plans for joint Franco-Soviet space 
research. January 1968. 
39 . Prime Minister Wilson's visit to the USSR . January 1968. 
40. U.K .-USSR scientific and technological agreement. 
41 . NATO declaration calling for discussions of mutual and 
balanced force reductions . June 1968. 
42. Signature of the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear 
weapons . July 1968. 
43 . Natural gas delivery contract consummated between the 
State of Bavaria and the USSR . September 1968. 
44 . U. K.-USSR civil air agreement. December 1969. 
45. Franco-Soviet civil air agreement. December 1969. 
46 . Italo-Soviet long-term agreement on the supply of Soviet 
natural gas to Italy. December 1969 . 
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is cockeyed about u.s. troops stationed abroad. President 
Eisenhower later recogn1zed that change was justified. He stated 
in 1963 that one U.S. d1v1sion would be suff1c1ent to fulfill our 
Q/ 
commitment to NATO. 
It is evident from these 1nd1cia of engagement with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that the tension that ex1sted 
in the early 'SO's has changed significantly. Further movement 
J2/, cont'd. from page 14. 
47. Soviet-West German agreements on supply of Soviet natural 
gas to West Germany. February 1970. 
48. Opening in Vietnna of U.S.-USSR negotiations on strategic 
arms limitation (SALT). April 1970. 
49. NATO declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions. 
May 1970. 
50. Signing of non-aggression treaty between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. August 1970. 
51. President Pompidou's visit to the USSR. October 1970. 
52. Signing of Franco-Soviet protocol on Franco-Soviet 
political cooperation. October 1970. 
53. Signing of treaty of normalization of relations between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. December 1970. 
54. Creation of a new basis for SALT negotiations. May 1971. 
55. Ouster of hard-line East German Communist leader, 
Walter Ulbricht. May 1971. 
56. Resumption of SALT negotiations. July 1971. 
57. Soviet-West German agreement to open consulates in 
Hamburg and Leningrad. July 1971. 
58. Signature of first part of quadripartite agreement on 
Berlin. September 1971. 
59. Chancellor Brandt's visit to the USSR. September 1971. 
60. U.S.-USSR agreement on exchanging information on certain 
missile testing activities. September 1971. 
61. U.S.-USSR agreement on improving the "hot line" between 
Washington and Moscow. September 1971. 
62. Secretary Brezhnev's visit to France. October 1971. 
63. Franco-Soviet agreement on economic, technical and 
industrial cooperation. October 1971. 
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has been proposeJ between East and West. As President Nlxon 
stated to a Joint Sesslon of the Congress on June 1, 1972: 
By forming habits of cooperation and strengthening 
institutional tles .n areas of peaceful enterprlse, these 
four agreements (Moscow sunmnl, May 1972) to whlch I have 
referred will create on both sldes a stearlily growlng vested 
interest in the malntenance of <JOOd relations between our 
two countries. 
Expanded United Statcs-Sovlet trade will also yleld 
advantages to both of o 1r nations. When the two l<1rgest 
economies ln the world start tradlng wlth each other on a 
much larger scale, ll'.'lng standards in both natlons ,..,lll 
rise and the stake whl~h both have ln peace will lncrease. 
12/, cont'd. from page 15. 
64. Romanla becomes a full contracting party to GATT. 
November 1971. 
65. Soviet-West German clvil a1r agreemen t . November 1971. 
66. Ratlficatlon by che West German parl1ament of the West 
German treatles wlth the Soviet Unlon and Poland. May 1972. 
67. Presldent Nlxon's vislt to Moscow. May 1972. 
68. U.S.-USSR agreement on coopera t 1on ln the explor<ltlon of 
outer space. May 1972. 
69. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperat1on in solvlng problems 
of the environment. I·lay 1972. 
70. U.S.-USSR agreement on JOlnt efforts in the fleld of 
medical sclence and publlc health . May 1972. 
71. U.S.-USSR agreement on expanded cooperat1on in sc1ence 
and technology and th£ establishment of a JOlnt comm1ssion for 
this purpose. May 19 2. 
72. U.S.-USSR agreement on coope ration between the American 
and Soviet navies to reduce Lhe chances of dangerous lncidents. 
May · l972. 
73. Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972. 
74. Signing of the final quadripartite agreement on Berlin. 
June 1972. 
75. 
cultural 
76. 
77. 
78. 
U.S.-USSR three yea r agreement on the export of U.S. agri-
commodllies(especlally wheat and feed grains). July 1972 . 
Settlement of USSR lend-lease obligations. October 1972. 
U.S.-USSR mar1time agreement. October 1972. 
Sign1ng of U.S.-USSR commercial treaty. October 1972. 
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It is tLme that the U.S. recognized the existence of its 
own policy toward the East. The policy of thls government should 
be cons is tent, not one of engagement with the Soviet Union in 
trade and cultural exchange and confrontation 1n military matters. 
There should be but one barolo'eter by which this government guides 
its actions toward the East. 
But we have many barometers that provide such different read-
ings for the same phenomenon. This dual standard for rationalizing 
our policies v1s-a-vis the Eastern bloc cannot withstand thoughtful 
focus. If our policy toward the East is predicated upon a desire 
to open markets and d e velop a mutual interdependency of East.and 
West upon each other, that policy will yield benefits beyond the 
economic sphere as they have with increased cultural and educa-
tional exchanges. It is a natural evolution of the events of the 
121. cont'd. from page 16. 
79. Quadripartite declaration supporting East and West German 
membership in the United Nations. November 1972. 
80. Signing of the basic treaty on relations between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 
December 1972. 
81. Opening of preparatory talks in Vienna for negotiations on 
mutual and balanced force reductions. January 1973. 
82. Soviet-West German 10-year agreement on the development 
of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, and cultural 
and educational exchanges. May 1973. 
1..§./. Hearings on "Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to 
Duty in the European Areas~" February, 195l,Committee on Foreign 
Relations and Committee on Armed Services,U.S.S.,82nd, 1st Sess. 
17/."Saturday Evening Post," October 26, 1973, page 27. 
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of the past decade. But ln lhe military sphere-- in the NATO 
structure--what remains is a stale rigidity; a resort to 
old rationalizat i ons from bygone years . 
But the double standard is not new , even within our own 
Alliance. Our Europ~an allies have permitted themselves to adapt 
to the changing mood between East and West. Not only docs France 
withdraw all its forces from NATO--a measure I do not propose for 
the U.S. to follow--but Canada reduces her military forces 
substantially. Other NATO nations have in recent years come far 
shorter of target force levels to NATO than the U.S.; in fact, 
the U.S. has been the most falthful burden-sharer over the 
history of the Alliance. Just two we eks ago, Secretary 
Schlesinger stated that the U.S. is doing more than its fair share 
~/ 
in Europe. But still the U.S. cannot take the unilateral 
action clearly called for in the Treaty--the unilateral action 
heretofore clearly contemplated by all the Treaty partners. Prior 
~I 
consultation would be ample, but the decision would be unilateral. 
The time has come for the United states to realize that 
tensions have eased between East and West--and that this relaxation 
18/. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, July, 1973, 93rd Cong.,lst Sess. 
19/. It was with disbelief that I read the newspaper reports of 
President Nixon's recent visit with President Pompidou of France 
in Iceland and the reports that President Pompidou told President 
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is a healthy and desirable change. 
The time has come to set aside the rhetoric of the Cold war 
used to justify a status quo of military involvement around 
the world. 
The time has come to recognlze action that is long overdue, 
and to prevent deferral of that action under a cloak of multi-
national negotiations that could take a decade or longer to 
recommend less than what is justified today . 
It is time now to respond to the spirit of detente, to the 
success of the Marshall Plan and the current economic vitality of 
Europe, to respond to the realities of the '70's, to respond more 
fully to the needs of its own people at home. 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 
So the absurdity of the U.S . -NATO posture for a long war ln 
Europe is indicative of the staleness of thought that has 
accompanied the American military position in the Atlantic Allia nce . 
While I have no intention of golng into detailed arguments 
19/,cont'd. from page 18 
Nixon that France would fight the removal of any U.S. troops from 
Europe, even if done in the context of the so-called "MBFR." 
Here is the President of one of the great countries of 
Western Europe which removed all their troops from the NATO Command 
in 1967 which has refused to participate in the mllitary aspects of 
NATO since that time, which responded very early to the changed 
circumstances of Europe--its political and economic health vis-a-vis 
the East, telling the President of the Unlted States that France 
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of a military character, there are a few points which I believe 
are directly relat1ve lo our consideration of the appropriate 
levels of U. S . forces 1n Europe . The main focus of lhese arguments 
is the so-called "flexible response" theory. This policy wus 
advanced early in 1965 by the United States but it was only formally 
adopted by NATO in 1967. I certainly have no quarrel with any 
policy which seeks to avoid automatic resort to nuclear war. And 
flexible response is a policy that should provide an expanded 
pause period before nuclear weapons are resorted to on either side. 
Unfortunately, however, "flexible response" has been inter-
preted as a reason to prepare for a full-scale convent1onal war of 
the World War II variety . But 1s it aga1n a case of the words 
replacing a thoughtful policy; of reducing the choices of NATO 
to either an immediate nuclear war or a prolonged and exclusively 
conventional war? Both are extremely unlikely. 
The "Economist", one of the more conservative Journals on 
European affairs, wrote on September 16, 1972: 
12J, cont'd. from page 19. 
would protest the removal of any American troops from the NATO 
Command in Europe. 
It is statements of this character that makes one wonder about 
the viability of u.s. European policy on forces in Europe. "Wash-
ington Post," June l, 1973; June 28, 1973. See also Address by 
Michel Jobert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Before the 
National Assembly, June 19, · 1973. 
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The heart of the matter is that most people believe 
that the present allied forces in Western Europe, including 
the present American contingent, would not be able to defend 
themselves for more than a week w~thout using nuclear weapons 
and perhaps for no more than two or three days. Removal of 
half the American contingent would probably reduce that to 
a maximum of four days and a minimum of one unless the 
Russians reduce their own army proport~onately or the 
West Europeans are able to make up the difference. 
So the doctr~ne of flex~ble respon! :e is most constructive in 
extending the pause period hefore any confrontation in Europe 
turns into a nuclear holoca'..lst. As the "Economist" noted, a week 
lS the maximum pause period that any European really feels the 
NATO s t ructure could undertake. This is basic realis:n. It ~s 
public knowledge that over 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons 
]:!!./ 
that are in position in Western Europe some of them reported very 
near the frontier. In view of this wide proliferation of nuclear 
warheads in Europe and some so near the frontier, it lS hard for 
me to envis~on any serious conventional war scenario that doesn't 
go nuclear in less than two days. Our "tactical" nuclear weapons 
will be either"captured" or "detonated." 
The "hot line" was installed in Washington and Moscow to 
20/. "The Mil~tary Balance 1972-1973," International Institute of 
S t rategic Studies, London, England, pg. 90. See also Testlmony 
Jo~nt Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Military Appl~cations, 
Apr~l 16, 1973, 93rd Cong., lst Sess. 
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permit wise use of the pause period. If a full-scale convent1onal 
war is the NATO strategy--then all the nuclear weapons--whether 
called tactical or strategic--should be removed far to the rear 
where there might then remain the option of not using these 
weapons. 
It 1s a total incons1stency to have tactical nuclear weapons--
some of them anchored into the ground near the frontier and to 
be preparing for a sixty-ninety day c~nventional war of the World 
War II variety in Europe. 
But still it 1s our premise that the American forces must 
be structured for a long war in Europe. Supply and logistic 
levels of American troops in Europe are for sixty-ninety days, 
putting an added burden on manpower and supplies well beyond the 
w 
realm of reason . 
£!.. "The NATO military objectives are deterrence and defence. 
Yet NATO,and the Un1ted States in particular, mainta1n all-purpose, 
offensive-oriented, expeditionary-style forces that do not provide 
the desired deterrence because of their low initial combat capability 
and their destabilizing tactical nuclear posture. A force structure 
oriented for deterrence and defence can be bought at much less than 
present cost--as Soviet forces in East Germany prove. Ad -justed 
(equal front-line platoon strength , defined as infantry, tank , 
cavalry, and ant1-tank) peacetime division slices (the division itself 
plus its share of non-divisional support personnel) total approxi-
mately 42,000 for American forces in West Germany; but only 18,500 
for Soviet forces." "The Wasteful Ways of NATO," Steven L. Canby, 
Survival, Vol. XV,No.l, Jan-Feb, 1973, Institute Strategic Studies, 
London, England. 
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But even more Sl Jnificant 1s the Eu r opean react i on to any 
removal of U. S. troops trom the Con tinent . It i s an accepted 
axiom that the Europeans v:ould f .ollow suit and r educe their 
22./ 
conventional force~ as ~ell . 
What 1s the lhreut , then , that r equires so many U. S. forces 
on the Continent? If there is a truly perceived t hreat of a 
conventional war from the East , would not our European u l lics who 
are closer to the "Lhreul" ther: respond by an accelerated commit -
ment of resou r ces? But no, they would relax as well , accept the 
w 
detente and devote more resources to non - mllitary ventures . Then 
why should we , 3 , 000 m1les away, assume such arrogance as to 
perceive a greaLer threat to Europe than do the Eu r opeans? 
I think the question presumes a rational answer but there is 
none . It does highlight , ho.vever , the dominance of the m1l1ta r y 
posture in Europe by the United States . Since the formation 
Supreme Allied 
of NATO, there has never been a I Commander who was not an 
American. U.S . perceptions of the th~eat are tolerated by the 
Europeans and why not--the U. S . lS f ooting the greatest share of 
the cost . Since 1t is really our nuclear response that the Eu r opeans 
11J . Testimony of Secretary Rush , House Foreign Affairs , Ju1y 10 , 1973 , 
93rd Congress , lst Sess . 
221 . Tes timony of Administration wi tnes s es , House Foreign Affa i rs , 
July 10 , 11 , 12, 1973 , 93rd Congress , 1st Sess . 
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wish committed, their tolerance for our eccentr1cities--including 
the World war II conventional war contingency--i s very high. 
Should the unlikely contingency of a mass movement by Warsaw 
Pact forces take place, it is inconceivable to me that the President 
of the Un1ted States would not be in immed1ate contact wilh h1s 
counterpart in the Soviet Union. In any event, to p1le incon-
sistency upon incons1stency, if the NATO military scenario cal ls 
for a defense of a mass1ve move from the East, that move must 
necessarily come across the north German plains, the likely area 
for a swift move because of the terrain. For th1s convent1onal 
attack the u.s. forces are stationed in the wrong part of Germany . 
The U.S. forces are positioned in central and southern Germany 
within an enormous back-up capacity and with a consistently top-
heavy command structure wh1ch still has one flag officer fo r 
roughly every 2,200 men. 
It baffles me why a properly structured U.S. military force 
of one or at the most two lean, mobile divisions, 1n position to 
move rapidly aLong the German frontier, would not be even greater 
insurance against any form of pressure from the East. 
It would be more realistic to the type of improbable attack 
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that might conceivably come from the East. It would permit American 
forces to be engaged from the beginn~ng , thus allaying any fears 
on the part of the Europeans th~t the United States would not be 
involved in the event of a qu~ck thrust into Western Europe. 
THE MBFR* 
Again and again over the years we have been told both by our 
own officials and those in Europe that some decrease in U.S. 
24/ 
military presence should take place. 
But the time is Dever right for such action. Two years ago 
the argument was the policy of Getente was underway and that 
nothing should be done that would disrupt the process, including 
the U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envisioned by 
Chancellor Brandt's "Ost_;_::>olitik." 
Today we find ourselves in a new situation. Success has been 
achieved in the first and most important round of SALT talks; 
the Warsaw and Moscow treaties have been concluded ; the status of 
Berlin has been regularized; through the exchanges of visits between 
President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev a new and better climate 
24/ . Most recent statement of Secretary of Defense Schlesjnger 
that the u . s. is doing more than its fair share in Europe. House 
Foreign Affairs, July 1973, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess. 
* I use the familiar abbreviation, MBFR, throughout, even 
the more proper abbreviation since the preliminary talks 
see: Final Communique of Preparatory Consultat~ons. 
though 
is MFR. 
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has been created which allows us to talk about the Cold War in 
terms of the past. 
Despite this movement, we are being told that this is the 
"worst possible time" in which to take any action on the question 
of our forces in Europe. The bargaining chip is back. Negotiations 
on mutual force reductions are to begin on Octobe r 30th of this 
]2/ 
year. 
At the outset we were told by all the experts that MBFR 
negotiations w~ll be even more complicated and lengthy than the 
first phase of SALT. Most informed and optimistic speculations 
are that the outcome of such negotiations after perhaps two to three 
years might be a reduction of no more than 10-15% on the part of 
w 
those countries involved. 
]2/. The communique announcing the intention to meet on October 
30th issued by the countries involved managed to lose the word 
"balance." When the Senate last voted on a proposed amendment to 
reduce U.S. forces in Europe, the distinguished Chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee received a letter from President Nixon 
stating h~ opposition to the amendment partly on the grounds that 
"we expect that Mr. Brosio will be received in Moscow next week 
to begin discussions on basic is sues of mutual and ba lanced force 
reductions." 
I do not myself doubt that this let ter from the President 
naturally had great weight with our colleagues. But Mr. Brosio 
never got to Moscow and preliminary discussions on MBFR did not 
begin until this past January, 14 months after that letter. 
26/. "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduct~ons," Library of Congress 
Study, 73-36F, February 2 , 1973 . 
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Nothing has happened in the interim s~nce President Nixon's 
letter of November 22, 1971, which has given us any different 
picture of this argument. Indeed, since the preliminary talks--
i.e., talks as to whether there should be talks--were expected 
to take roughly five weeks and took about five months, my 
skepticism has been increased rather than diminished about MBFR. 
I really doubt that the United States can remain immobilized on 
the troops question for a minimum of two and possibly even four to 
five years. So the argument to wait for MBFR really is a post-
ponement of significant action indefinitely. 
UNILATERAL ACTION 
The questions of MBFR are immensely complicated even if they 
were undertaken in a bilateral framework. The positioning of 
forces, the proportionate reduction of one side as opposed to 
the other because of different logistical requirements will 
generate solutions equal to the number of participants at the 
~/ 
conference. So the complexity of MBFR ~s magnified 19 times. 
The wisdom of the North Atlantic Treaty which left the question 
of specific troop commitments in the NATO command to be decided 
£21. There are 19 countries participating in MBFR. See Appendix E. 
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unilaterally by each country is abandoned ln MBFR. Unilateral 
action on such a matter lS the only practical method. Any nation 
entering into negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral only 
agrees in those negotiations to what she determines unilaterally 
she can do or must do in her own national interest. No negotiation 
with the Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union to reduce any 
of its troops from Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union determines 
that those troops are needed in the Eastern European countries 
for other than protectlon against an external threat. In like 
manner, if the Soviet Union senses a greater need for its troops 
on other frontiers, or if she desires to divert a grea t er pro-
portion of her resources to non-military interes t s, then t h e 
appropriate reduct1ons by the USSR will be made--but only t hen. 
So unilateral a c tio n on our part to reduce U.S. troops 
in Europe, while still maintaining our commi t men t with a more 
wisely structured but significantly reduced level of troops 
could very well stimulate a similar independently arrived at 
response on the part of the Soviet Union. This is not unprecedented 
in recent history. Unilateral and independent actions taken by 
the United States and the Soviet Union for moratoriums on nuclear 
tests in the atmosphere precipitated similar constructive independent 
responses on each s1de which ultimately led to the nuclear test ban 
treaty. So the arguments that un1lateral action cannot lead to 
constructive 
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£§/ 
responses are unwarranted. 
Unilateral action on the part of the Un1ted States might 
produce surprising and constructive results. What people fail 
to realize is that the Soviet Union, ever since World War II, has 
not only been acting, but reacting, within its military establis~ 
ment. Much of the Soviet force was created at a tinle when the 
Unlted States had clear nuclear superiority. Most informed 
observers, here and in Western Europe, agree that the Soviet 
Union is considerably more conservative and suspicious than the 
United States because of its historical experiences and the 
w 
character of its society. 
Yetno one seems willing to make allowances for the inertia 
of this military conservatism in the USSR. We forget that the 
speeches by our NATO Commanders, as well as our political leaders, 
28/. I only wish that the classic argument of doing things in 
unison with the Soviet Union would be applied when it comes to 
the stationing of u.s. forces on foreign soil. According to 
figures published by the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, the Soviet Union has about 15,000 troops stationed out-
side of Soviet territory and Eastern Europe, whereas the United 
States has about 300,000 military forces scattered around the 
world, outside the U.S. and Europe. A parity with the Soviet 
Union in this area would be a significant and constructive start 
towards bringing America home again. 
In its Eastern European satellites, USSR has stationed 
330,000 USSR troops. See New York Times, July 20, 1973. The 
total USSR troops outside of Soviet soil is therefore 345,000. 
~/. See Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York 1967). 
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regarding need for NATO strength and readiness are read in quite 
a different light by the Soviet leadership than we intend. It seems 
a simple proposition, that they trust us no more than we trust 
them, but we do not seem to be able to absorb this view and 
act upon it. 
THE FINANCIAL BURDEN 
Mr. Chairman, I have not dwelled upon the question of budgetary 
drain and balance-of-payments costs of our troops stationed 
overseas. I have deliberately left this point to one sLde in con-
sidering these questions because I believe the UnLted States wLll 
bear the necessary costs to fulfill its international obligations. 
Our history will show that! But I believe it is clear that the 
UnLted States can fulfill its internatLonal obligations abroad 
with a significant reduction of u.s. forces on f o reign soil. 
I believe a focus on this Lssue can b e gained at last 
because of the competition for resources at home. But these 
resources will be saved, not by trimming our sails on our inter-
national obligations but by trimming the waste from years of 
inattention to a rational international policy. 
This committee is well aware that the overall costs of our 
commitment to NATO amounts to something in the neighborhood of 
----------------
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$17 bill1on, includ1ng everyth1ng except strategic forces; that 
the direct annual operating costs for the approx1mately 300,000 U.S. 
forces actually located in Europe amounts to approximately $4 
lQI 
b1llion; that the net balance of payments dra1n because of the 
u.s. forces in Europe is approximately $1.5 b1ll1on annually; and that 
these figures are growing da11y because of the Un1ted States' 
disadvantage because of inflation, successive devaluations of the 
dollar and other weakenings. 
A return to rationality on the part of the Un1ted States and 
its forces abroad would y1eld a very significant savings in 
resources to the United States. I have deliberately, Mr. Chairman, 
not addressed myself to the issue of whether the troops that should 
be removed from foreign soil should be demobilized. It is my 
opinion that a very sound international policy for the Un1ted States 
could be 1mplemented with a reduction of 50% of the over 500,000 
troops stationed on foreign soil. 
The return of over 250,000 military personnel would reflect 
the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing inter-
national and domestic obligations and therefore appropriate for 
demob1lizat1on. But I don't think that the quest1on of 
lQ/. Testimony of William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 12, 1973, 
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 
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demobilization has to be directly addressed at th1s time s1nce I 
believe the pressures of obtaining a military armed force without 
the draft w1ll to a great extent resolve the issue of demobilization. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a course of action 
which I hope you will agree is most reasonable and desirable. 
I believe it is a course that provides the appropriate civilian 
guidance to our military leaders and gives them sufficient 
lattitude in adjusting for themselves the specific reduction 
which would stem from this proposal. 
I believe that we should move in the direction of a 50% 
reduction of our total forces stationed in all overseas 
territories. I believe this reduction should be accomplished 
within a three-year period and in a carefully structured way 
which would not necessarily entail the same percentage reduction 
in each of the three years or in any one area of the world, but would 
provide that not less than 25% of the total envisioned cut would 
take place in each of the three years. I prefer to do this 
on a worldwide basis because I believe the United States is 
overextended precisely on that basis. 
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Secondly, I would suggest confining the cuts to land-based 
units in order to permit our fleets to operate at appropriate 
strengths, but at the same t~me not excluding home ported naval 
units from the overall computation. 
Finally, I am proposing to leave as much discretion to our 
military commanders as is commensurate with our foreign policy 
interests. 
In sum, Mr. Chairman, the wasteful expression of our external 
power--expression well beyond any reasonable need--has begun to 
erode our internal freedom. The disclosures of recent months 
might very well be interpreted in part as the methodology of the 
American Empire returning home to undermine the fibre of our 
w 
republic. 
I believe we have talked, debated and quarreled long enough 
about th~s whole problem of U.S. foreign policy as it is 
implemented abroad. The time for act~on is long overdue and action 
is what I hope this Committee will recommend. 
~ee 
111. David P. Calleo, The Atlantic Fantasy (Johns Hopkins Press 1970) 
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l.'c h .,•Je ~nt lwred t o r eso l v e the que ction of participation 
;~n t~ procr·,1\l r c s. In th~8 conn(~ctio n v1e , t\P. I understand , nre to 
! 1 '·~r nJ1 \e :ooints nnd four stat c!nents . 
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'2.~1 e Peo pl e ' s R~pub .l ic of 3u:!. c, Aria 
Cn n.:l.c!a 
T~.e Czechoslovnk Socialist Republ ic 
':'' 1e CQr!·!.l !1 !)Cl'loc r at:!. c Republ~.c 
'1" e Fee c,. ~ 1 Republic o: Gel·n1<1ny 
;· ~1e Kingt:o•n of Gr eece 
T:w lh,nr,11rian Pe ople ' s Repub:!.ic 
The J. ta li<~n Re public 
The Gr.nnrl Duchy of: Luxem')Qurg 
T~c Po lish People ' s ~epu~lic 
'fl1e Soc:!.:::l i st E·: pu b li.t of :Zom.:mia 
!'':('. Re public of Tu rkey 
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p o t ·..: 11 t i :~ ' r• 3 r t .!_ c ~ ry an t s i n !1 o s s !_ ~' 1 t> a ~~ r c c !TIe n t s ~- e 1 a t e d to 
Cr·n •_r-.1 ~ l>Jropc , H:l1J t .:> '~c t~1e ncccss.1 1·y cccisions by consensus: 
r·.: na c a 
'l he K i !i ./ u r'l ~· .: t ', c !\ c t he r 1 a n c s 
The PoJ ~sl,_ h~c:jJ_ ,__. ' s !<.ep u:) l~c 
'!he 1..1n ~ .-n of ~ )\':let: Socialis t Rep ublics 
Tl1c T}n ' cd Jf'n~:· O!T! n[ C:ren t Brit a in and Nor t hern I reland 
I f r\llut her .·u. te \-.'ish,~ s to be i ncluded among t he s t a tes 
l i stc!d i:1 t his nn1.gr2p'1 anc~ this is alj r e ed by consensus o f the 
rcprc~C!I~Jtivc~ of ~~c ~tates lis t ed in this para gr aph, it ma y 
G0. :.o in r luct~d , :__ uc' t in c2.usion in nerot i a tio n s o r decision s 
rc) n ::eel 1 o Cen tra~. Eu ropr:> cou 1..c1 eit he r be general or, j_f so 
,:r;rvcd , could l1e for the l.~mitcd purpose of taking par t in a 
p:trt~_cu~ ··r c.le c i!:ioTt n-::- dt;c.i.sion:. r. ela t i ng t o t his s ubject. It 
:!_:; \1 !1<!cr~ ':ood th<lt such ncd~_tiona l pa rt i cipat i on i n decicions , 
n~;r r·r·m01'-~ ; , o r "•'nsm•~s ~10ulc be \dt ho u t prejudice to the 
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3. The following states will particij1<Jtc with a Si1L:C j .. l 
status: 
The People's HeiJublic of Eulgal."ia 
The Kingdom of Denmari< 
The Kingdom of Grcccl:! 
The Hungarian People's Republic 
The Italian Rcpu.l)lic 
The Kingdom of l'\orway 
The Socialist Republic of Romania 
The Republic of 7urkey. 
4, All participants will be seated as listeci in ;>ar,,;c· .-·, ,· , , 
according to the English vers ion. 
5. The chairmanship will rotate fro m n1cctin~ t o me~· L :i ... , : 
among the representative s of ti1e states listed in 
in the order set f o rt h i n t he English version. The f ir~~ 
chairman will be ~rawn by lot. 
6. All participants will have the right to sp e ak <me; Lu 
.. circulate papers on the subject matter. 
7. The meetings will be open only to the particip~Gt~ . 
I 
8, Following the opening statements, proceed i ngs a1;o 
documents of the meeting s will be confidential cxcei1t for Li ,t•:.l 
matters on which it is agreed in advance that anothe r )n·occ·ci\:. • 
will be followed, There will be no official recor d s of li<CL:t: i .1 . 
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9. The oHicial languat;cs \oJill be English, h:<.:nci1, (. .·1 ... .~ , 
and Russian. 
Hr. n. Ouar.lcs v~n Ufrord: 
The representatives o[ nclgium, Canndil, the Fedcr.1l •. . ' I·,,'' 
of Germany, Luxembourg, ti·1c Ncti1erlands, the United l~i : .1.d• .,., , ... 
the United Sta.tcs of America wish to poi.nt out t l ~.1t: Li.l ... , , . , 
menta for the participation of Hungary in l:he:;c con;,u:!.L.Ji ·.,, . 
are without prejudice to the nature o[ i!ung<~ry' G pat·t:it' L1,. t • . 
in future negotiations, decisions, or nr,rccd Jl!Casun: ~. 11r t.-. ,, • 
security of any party, and th<,t, in p<Articulnr, Li: C' qu e.; , ll ; " " • 
how and to wh<1t extent Huncary will he included in f ur u l'L 
decisions, agreements, o1· measures must be examined and dL .: .• . , , , 
during the pending negotiations. 
1-lr. E. Untor: 
In connection with the unilateral statc;nent o( til~ r·· 11.-1 • .. 1 • 
of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Lu:·:(.!J,,L.,,; 1 1 ', , 
th~ N~thGrbncl&, th~ UnH~a Kin~oom 1 rmd llw Uun(~d ;.; c;JL· ·:. ••· 
America the r<!presentative of the Hungarian People 1 s 1\c l)lil •J .. 
wishes to state the following: 
As the representatives of Hungary and of other :>oci .• il. 1 :: t 
states have explained during the course of the consult •. L.iuJI :, , 
Hungary could consider participation in possible ciccisjon :. , 
agreements, or measures only if the appropriate condition:; ;n·l 
fulfilled, 
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Hr. B. Quat·les van ll1-fonl: 
It is · undcrstooci th<lt ti1e arrm1r;cmE:nt on pnnici1l;, Liu .. 
and procedures being adopted today will also be ap~lic~ jl: 
the forthcoming negotiations. 
Mr. O.N. Kh:t.cr.tov: 
It is agreed that the an·<lngcmcnt on participiition <J11u 
procedure.s being adopted today 't.•ill nlso be apj)licd in t;,(' 
forthcomirlg negotiations. This docs not pt-cclurie the 
possi~ility of raising the question of invitin(; olhn- ;:t•rCJ ," .. ,, 
states to participate in these negotiations as ob s~rvc1·~ . 
.'Chairman (~:r.. J.A. Thornson): 
A~i ~he~a any objQotiona7 
I wee nona. 
It will be so recorded. 
* * * * * * * * 
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U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE 
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, this 
morning the Subcommittee on Arms Con-
trol, International Law and Organiza-
tion of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee held hearings on "Mutual Force Re-
ductions in Europe." We were particu-
larly fortunate to have with us two wit-
nesses who have had a great deal of ex-
perience with and a long-standing in-
terest in the issue of U.S. troops levels in 
Europe-the distinguished majority 
leader, MIKE MANSJ'IELD, and Deputy Sec-
retary of State Kenneth Rush. ' 
Mr. President, for three decades, the 
United States ha&.- been intimately in-
volved with the political integrity and 
the military security· of Western Europe. 
In the emerging. post-Vietnam era, one 
of the most important elements in our 
foreign po11cy will be our political, eco-
nomic, and military relations with our 
European allies. 
A key· issue in those relations is the 
u.s. milltary commitment to Europe. At 
present, we have more than 300,000 
troops and 250,000 dependents stationed 
on the other side of the Atlantic. This 
represents the largest overseas deploy-
ment of American forces today. In all, we 
have nine active divisions earmarked for 
duty in the NATO theater as well as 40 
Air Force Squadrons and the 6th 
Fleet-to say nothing of many other ele-
ments of our overall strategic nuclear de-
terrent deployed at home and abroad. 
The cost of maintaining American forces 
in Europe, together with those in the 
United States that have NATO missions, 
has steadily climbed from $12 billion in 
fiscal 1971 to an estimated $17.7 billion 
in fiscal 1973. The balance-of-payments 
deficit resulting from milltary accounts 
in Europe is estimated at more than $1.5 
b11lion for fiscal1973. 
A number of events have recently oe·-
curred which have significantly altered 
the European political and economic 
landscape-the Moscow and Washington 
summit meetings and growing East-West 
detente; the SALT I Agreement; the 
Berlin Accords; the preliminary negotia-
tions on European Security and on Mu-
tial and Balanced Force Reductions; the 
entry or' Great Britain, Ireland, and Den-
mark into the Common Market; and two 
successive devaluations of the dollar, to 
name just a few. Despite these changes, 
the Defense Department has indicated 
in its milltary manpower report for fiscal 
1974 its interest in maintaining the same 
military commitment in Europe that we 
had this past year. 
Few doubt the need for a strong, credi-
ble NATO. Few doubt that the military 
strength of the Alliance has played an 
important role in bringing about the 
much-improved East-West situation. But 
in View of our improved relations with 
the SoViets, in View of our own economic 
problems, and in view of the failure of 
the now-prosperous Europeans to assume 
a significantly larger share of the NATO 
burden, a number of questions have been 
raised about our present policies which 
this subcommittee intends to examine: 
the rationale for the continued mainte-
nance of oU!' present force levels in 
Europe; the magnitude of the expendi-
tures-and resulting balance of pp.yments 
deficit-to maintain these forces; and 
the prospects for reducing American 
forces in Europe on a mutual basis at 
this time. 
The administration has taken the 
position that this country would be un-
wise to reduce unilaterally our military 
commitment in Europe, even by a token 
number. The administration has argued 
that there is nothing "immutable" about 
the exact number of men we have sta-
tioned in Europe, but that any unilateral 
reduction of U.S. forces in Europe would 
start "the process of unraveling the 
peacetime defen.Se of the West" and 
"cripple" future efforts to negotiate mu-
tual cutbacks with Warsaw Pact nations. 
Nearly 2 years ago, I stated my own 
view in a Senate speech that "mutual 
force reductions in Europe represent one 
of the most critical and important arms 
control possibilities in the near future." 
I urged the a.dmln1stration "to move 
forthrightly" toward this goal. I continue 
to support efforts on the part of our 
Government to negotiate a mutual re-
duction of forces in Europe. And I look 
forward with great hope to the NATO-
Warsaw Pact negotiations on Mutual 
Force Reductions in Europe which are 
scheduled to begin in Vienna on Octo-
ber 30 of this year. 
On the other hand, we should all re-
member that the preliminary Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions sessions, 
begun in January 1973, took 5 months 
instead of the planned 5 weeks; and that 
the upcoming so-called Mutual Forces 
Reduction talks will take 1 to 2 years at 
a minimum, by the administration's own 
estimates. In the short-run, we must con-
cern ourselves with very real economic, 
military and political problems which 
might not easily be filed away while our 
diplomats negotiate. 
U.S. forces have been stationed in 
Western Europe in large numbers since 
Congress acted in 1951 to bolster our 
ground forces there by four divisions in 
the belief that hostilities in Korea might 
lead to a sharply increased Soviet threat 
to the nations of Western Europe. Since 
1951 the number of milltary personnel 
stati~ned in Europe has been determined 
by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the National Secu-
rity Council. This is not as it should be. 
Congress has the constitutional respon-
sibility to review and reshape our force 
levels and our overseas deployment when 
necessary. I hope that the hearings which 
began this morning in my subcommittee 
will be tn important step in giving Con-
gress the information and understanding 
necessary to carry out its constitutional 
duty with respect to our security needs 
in Europe. 
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Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- · 
cent that the testimony given this morn-
ing by Senator MANSFIELD and Deputy 
Secretary R\ISh be printed in the RECORD 
at this point. 
There being no objection, the testi-
mony was ordered to be printed in the 
RECOJ\P, as follows: 
STI\TJ:MEN-r ~ SlrNATOR Mnc.: MANSriiiLD Bl:-
r o RE THE SOBCONINITTI<£ ON ARMS CONTROL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANO 0RGANIZATIONII, 
JULY lli, 1973 
Mr. Cha1nnan, I want to begin by thank-
Ing you tor the invitation to address this 
committee on t h e question o! U .S. forces in 
Europe--as well aa on the broader context 
in which we must place our consideration. 
the question o! U .S. military forces arou,nd 
the world. 
The United States currently has stat ioned 
on foreign soil over 600,000 military person-
nel.' In addition, over 100,000 military per-
sonnel are. a.doat off !ol:etgn shores.• AlmO<Jt 
30% ot our muttary forces are stationed 
beyond our homeland. Not since the days of 
the British Empire or probably more truly, 
the RomAn Empire, have so many been re-
quired to "maintain the peace" away !rom 
their shores. • 
I believe lt Is Important to view the quee-
ttoon in the broad context of U.S. 1oroes sta-
tioned around the world. It has been paln-
fully evident and generally agreed in the 
United States Senate for at least the last 
several years that the Untted States Is badly 
over-extended abroad. 
We must not forget the lesson of the tragic 
war in VIetnam; for that tragedy will only 
be compounded 1! we refuse to learn and 
gu1c1e our actlona accordingly. 
The National Commitments Resolution 
pa.ed. overwhelml.ngly by the Senate was 
slgnl.11cant evidence of the prevailing senti-
ment In the Senate.• The War Powers legis-
lation pM8ed overwhelmingly by both Houses 
of Con~rr~~sa Is another slgnltlcant step.• 
But tbeee vital actions reform and retlne 
our Institutional mechanisms. They serve 
notice of the Oongre881onal threShold of tol-
erance. They demonstrate a Congre881onal 
attitude that -Ita a greater share of re-
sponslblllty. But these constructive changes 
are not enough. We must accept the realiza-
tion that our commitments and polic ies are 
not always made in formal and tradition al 
ways. In fact, some pollcles seem to "Just 
happen." 
The presence of so many U.S . forces on 
foreign aoU' Is such a policy. Their presence 
presumes a pollcy that heavUy favors the 
military option. The War Powers legislation 
expre-s Congre88lonal di8811nt to that 
emphasis. But the fundamental dlfflcultll in 
duoernlng aemblance to America'~ polfcll 
abroad u that the commitment and level of 
U.S. forces abroculluu determined our polfcll 
rather than ovr polfcll determtnlng the level 
of U .S. forcea abroad. The lntract&bUity of 
executive branch attitude on force levels 
abroa,l durlng the past 25 years can only be 
explained by the incapacity o! the policy-
makers to perceive that the troops on foreign 
soU was our policy and policy-makers were 
really articulating after-the- fact rationaliza-
tions. Members of the Executive Branch , 
whether In oftl.ce !or two weelta, two months, 
two years or two decades, have had the &am e 
theme, and It 111 always one that the world 
will fall 1! any of our soldiers return h ome. 
But yearning to return home shall becom e 
more compelling with each passing m onth. 
The Impoundment by this Administration of 
e12 billion for domestic needs; the cloelng of 
many U.S. military bases as an economy 
measure, putting many Americans out of 
work; the devaluation of the dollar by more 
than 25% over t he past two years; all wlll 
Join In marshalling attention to wh lllt hereto-
Pootnotee at end of artJcle. 
fore has been considered an issue that should 
be let.t to the "experts." I believe the argu-
ments this year will be beard. 
As I stated above, the plain fact ls that the 
U nited States s tations over 600,000 military 
f orces ou tside the United States and Ita ter-
ritor ies and possessions. We maintain over 
2 000 bases and Installations on foreign soli.• 
There are over 314,000 dependents stationed 
o verseas accompanying these forces .• The 
Defense Department employs directly or Indi-
rectly a pproximately 173,000 foreign nationals 
at these bases overseas to support these U.S. 
forces abroad.' These are not reasons !or 
bringing our troops home, but they are facts 
that should make America listen to the 
reasons. 
The most detailed focus can be obtained on 
Europe. At least In 1950 the Congre88 was 
asked to participate In that decision of send-
Ing troops to tba.t Continent. But equally 
forceful questions can be raised as well to 
the U.S. troop co=ltmenta in Thailand-
n ow about 45,000; or in Oklnawa, about 
40,000; or Korea, about 42,000; or Taiwan, 
about 8,000; or the PhUipplnes, about 15,000; 
or Japan, about 18,000; or even Bermuda 
where about 1,000 men defend our national 
Interests.• 
Let us look at Europe where NATO was 
tlrs t structured. Let us look at the realities 
t hat faced this Nation at that time which 
precip itated the commitment of !our divi-
sions to Europe. Let us look a.t the premises 
upon which the Congress &8811nted to this 
commitment of these divisions and the rep-
resentations tba.t were made at that tlme 
about the permanence of such a oo=ltment 
of manpower abroad. Then let us look at 
Europe and the U.S. today, 28 years after 
the War, 23 ye&cs after the Initial stationing 
of these divisions to NATO. 
ll:tla<>PS AFTI:Jl WORLD WAll n 
World War ll left Western Europe In ruins. 
The general view In the West was that the 
oommunlst monollst under Stalin had the 
domin ation of the entire planet as Its goal. 
The United States moved swiftly with the 
most maaslve reconstruction effort ever a.t-
tempted with Ita Marshall Plan-an effort 
t hat b as proven succe88ful beyond expecta-
tions. The Institutions of Europe, political, 
econom ic as well as military, were In 
shambles. With theee weakened conditions In 
Europe combined wltb the co=on percep-
t ion of the threat of the hordes from the 
East • a strong mUitary presence In West-
ern Europe to compliment the economic effort 
was rational. But the North Atlantic Treaty 
Itself did not commit U.S. troops to the Eu-
ropean continent for deterrence. In !act, the 
trea ty Itself made no commitment or U.S. 
ground troops to Europe. It was not until 
1951 t hat the decision was made to send four 
land divisions to Europe and Congre88lonal 
assent solicited to this significant commit-
ment of troops. 
The h istory of proceedings before the Oon-
gresa are very revealing. 
Secretary Marshall claimed at that time 
that there was nothing magical about four 
d ivisions. The full level was selected based 
u pon a judgment of our resources and their 
avallabWty. It only the same standard were 
to be a p plied today. And why should It not be 
applied ? •• 
But even more revealing Is the exchange 
that Senator Hlckentooper had with Secre-
tary Acheson· when It was made clear by Sec-
retary Acheson that the original NATO 
Treaty envisioned no troops stationed In Eu-
rope by the United States and that It was 
clear that each signatory to the NATO Treaty 
would unilaterally make Ita own determina-
tion of Ita contribution of military equip-
ment, manpower .and facUitles.u In addition, 
Secretary Acheson envisioned the return of 
t roops su bsequently sent 1! the sltua.tlon got 
better. · 
But wha t conditions were envisioned in 
1951 that Initially warranted the troops to go 
to Europe and what thorny questions should 
be resolved for us to expect their return. 
Senator Smith of New Jersey sought this in-
formation !rom General Bradley In 1951 .an d 
General Bradley felt the making of a peace 
treaty wltb Germany and the state of p re-
paredness of the other n ations of Europe .as 
well as the aggressive Intentions of the East 
were the chief Irritants that justified U.S. 
action." 
These were all valid concerns In 1951. In 
addition, It was & time when the Korean War 
was underway; China was a n active enemy; 
the Soviets bad come of nuclear age; the 
South East European tlank was still threat -
ened; the economies of Western ]j;urope were 
just back on their feet; political lnstabUity 
was prevalent in most West European coun-
tries. Strong men replaced strong institutions 
and provided the cohesion for Western Eu-
rope. But even then the questions were 
raised : Should the U.S. commit four d ivisions 
to Europe as a deterrent to another European 
Will at least untU Europe Is ready to assu me 
Ita own defenses. 
The Congr ess assented to that requ est and 
the American t roops returned to Europe to 
meet the threa t tha t was perceived at that 
tlme. However real the threat t hen , b as lt 
changed since that t lme? 
EUllOPE SINCE THE ' 5 0'S 
Whe11- U.S. troops were Initially committed 
to the European continent, total GNP of all 
European NATO countries was $46.9 bUllon 
compared to e831.9 b illion for 1972.11 The era 
of confrontation was h igh an d the nat ional 
institutions were weak. Interrelat ionships 
were virtually non-existent. Let us look at 
and contrast. the economic exchange: 
(In millions) 
1951 
U.S. Imports from U.S.S.R . . e27. 4 
U.S. exports to U.S.S.R.... 0.1 
U .S. Imports from Eastern 
Europe----- -- ---------- 63.8 
U .8. exports to E&atern 
Europe ---------- - - - -- 2. 8 
197Z 
• 9 5. 6 
546. 7 
320. 1 
818. 2 
The total exports from all NATO coun-
tries to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe In 
1972 amounted to e9.89 billi~. The Impor ts 
from the U.S.S.R. and Easte'rn Europe to 
NATO countries totaled e8.67 bllllon." In t hls 
one .area alone of trade between the blocs, the 
most dramatic change in climate must be 
recognized. 
But even more signl.11cant than evaluating 
not only the strength of Western Europe and 
appreciating the strong trade tlow between 
East and West ls the great number of events 
since 1963 that manttest as well as signifi-
cantly contribute to the lessening of ten-
sions .between East and West. I have selected 
eighty-two events [ consider significant since 
1963.•• They range !rom the hot line to the 
Nuclear Test Ban to the Consular Conven tion 
to the Non-proliferation Treaty to the treaty 
normalizing relations between Germany and 
Poland; to the Soviet-West German agree-
ment on consulates; to the German treaties 
with Sov!et Unton; to the SALT treaty; to 
the signing of the treaty on relations be-
tween East and West Germany. But to m any 
the threat of an all-out conventional war 
with the hordes from the East remains the 
same. Rigidity. affects not on ly the rhetor ic 
but the policy. General Eisenhower testify-
Ing in 1951 about Congre88lonal responsibil-
ity ln the determination and the evolution of 
the level of U.S. troops in Europe said: 
"I do tlllnk that Congress ought to see a 
respectable, reasonable approach, and the 
second they see anything to be, let's say, 
cockeyed and crazy, to get into the t hing 
with both feet."" 
Well, Mr. Chairman , I think the tlme has 
come when Congress must recognize that in 
the words of Gen e ral Eisenhower, eomet hing 
Is cockeyed abou t U.S. troops stationed 
abroad. Presid en t Eisenhower later recog-
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nlzed that change WM justified. He stated In 
1963 that one U.S. division would be sum-
clent to tulOil our commitment to NATO." 
lt ls evident from these lndlcla or engage-
ment with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Euro!>@ thr.t the tension that existed In the 
~arly ':iO's hns changed significantly. Further 
movement bas been proposed between Bast 
r.nd West. As ~•!dent NIXon stated to a 
J omt Session of the Congress on June 1, 1972: 
"By forming habits of cooperation and 
strengthening Institutional ties In areas of 
peaceful enterprise, the.se four agreements 
(Moscow summit, May 1972) to which I have 
referred wlll create on both sides a steadily 
growing vested Interest In the maintenance 
of good relations between our two countries. 
"Expanded United States-Soviet trade Will 
also yield advantages to both or our nations. 
When the two largest economies In the world 
start trading with each other on a much 
larger scale, living standards In both nations 
wlll rise and the stake which both have In 
peace wlll inCrease." 
It Is time that the U.S. recognized the ex-
Istence or Its own polfcy toward the East. The 
pollcy of this government should be consist-
ent, not one of engagement with the Soviet 
Union In trade and cultural exchange and 
confrontation In military matters. There 
should be but one barometer by which this 
government guides Its actions toward the 
Eaat. 
But we have many barometers that provide 
such dltl'erent readings for the ssme phenom-
enon. This dual standard !or ratlonallzlng 
our polloles vill-a-vis the Eastern bloc cannot 
withstand thoughtful focus. I! our policy 
toward the East Is predicated upon a desire 
to open markets and develop a mutua! Inter-
dependency or Eaet and West upon each 
other, that poUcy Will yield benefits beyond 
the economic sphere as they have with In-
creased cultural and educational exchanges. 
It Ia a natural evolution or the events of the 
past decade. But In the military spher-.tn 
~e NATO structure-what remains Is a stale 
rigidity; a resort to old rationalizations !rom 
bygone years. ' 
But the double standard Is not new, even 
Within our own Alliance. Our European allies 
have permitted themselves to adapt to the 
changing mood between East and West. Not 
oniy does Prance Withdraw all Its forces !rom 
NATO-a measure I do not propose !or the 
U.S. to follow-but Canada reduces her mili-
tary forces substantially. Other NATO na-
tions have In recent years come fa.r shorter 
of ta.rget force levels to NATO than the U.S.; 
In fact, the U.S. has been the most faithful 
burden-sbe.rer over the history of the Alli-
ance. Just two weeks ago, Secretary Schle-
singer stated that the U.S. Is doing more than 
Its fair Share In Europe.u But still the t:" .S. 
cannot take the unilateral action clearly 
called for In the Treaty-the unilateral ac-
tion heretofore clearly contemplated by all 
the Treaty partners. Prior consultation would 
be ample, but the decision would be unilat-
eral.'" 
The time has come for the United States 
to realize that tensions have eased between 
J!lMt and West-and that this relaxation Is 
a healthy and desirable obange. 
The time has come to set aside the rhetoric 
ot the Oold War used to justify a status quo 
of mUltary Involvement around the world. 
The time has come to recognize action 
that Is long overdue, and to prevent deferral 
of that action under a cloak o! multinational 
negotiations that could take a decade or 
longer to recommend less than what Is just1-
11ed today. 
It Is time now to respond to the spirit ot 
detente, to the success of the Marshall Plan 
and the current economic vitality of Europe, 
to respond to the realities or the '70's, to 
respond m~ fully to the needs of Ita own 
people at home. 
n.EXIIILJI: RII:BPONSIC 
So the absurdity of the U.S.-NATO poeture 
tor a long war In Europe Ia Indicative of the 
staleness of thought that has aocompanled 
the American military poeltion In the Atlan-
tic Alliance. 
Whlle I have no Intention of going Into 
detailed arguments of a mllltary character, 
there are a !ew points which I believe are 
dlrectly relative to our consideration of the 
appropriate levels or U.S. forces In Europe. 
The main focus .of these arguments 1s the 
so-<l6Jied ".flexible response" theory. This 
policy was advanced early In 1965 by the 
United States b~t It was only !orma11y 
adopted by NATO In 1967. I certainly ha.ve 
no quarrel With any policy Which seeks to 
avoid automatic resort to nuclear war. And 
:flexible response Is a policy that should pro-
vide an expanded pause period before nuclear 
weapons are resorted to on either side. 
Unfortunately, however, "flexible response" 
has been Interpreted as a reason to prepare 
for a full-scale conventional war of the 
World War II variety. But Is It again a case 
of the words replacing a thoughtful pollen 
or reducing tbe choices or NATO to either an 
Immediate nuclear war or a prolonged and 
exclusively conventional war? Both are ex-
tremely unll~ely. 
The "Eoonomlat", one of the more con-
servative journals on European affairs, wrote 
on September 18, 1972: 
"The heart or the matter Ia that most 
people believe that the present allied forces 
In Western Europe, Including the present 
American contingent, would not be able to 
defend themselves for more than a week 
Without using nuclear weapons and perhaps 
for no more than two or three days. Removal 
of half the American contingent would prob-
ably reduce that to a maximum of four days 
and a minimum of one unless the Russians 
reduce their own army proportionately or 
the West Europeans are able to make up 
the dl1ference." 
So the doctrine of :flexible response Ia most 
oonstruotlve In extending the pause period 
before any confrontation In Europe turns 
Into a nuclear holocaust. As the "Economist" 
noted, a week !.a the maximum pause period 
that any European really reels the NATO 
structure could undertake. This Is basic 
realism. It Is public knowledge that over 7,000 
tactical nuclear weapons that are In poeltlon 
In Western Europe"' some of them reported 
very near the frontier. In view ot this wide 
proliferation of nuclear warheads In Europe 
and some so near the frontier, It Is hard for 
me to envlalon any serious conventional war 
scenario that doesn't gc nuclear In less than 
two days. Our "tactlca1" nuclear weapons will 
be either "captured" or "detonated." 
The "hot llne" wae Installed In Washing-
ton and Moecow to permit wise use of the 
pause period. If a full-scale conventional war 
Is the NATO strategy-then all the nuclear 
weapons--whether called tactical or stra-
tegic--should be removed far to the rear 
where there might then remain the option 
of not using these weapons. 
It Is a total Inconsistency to have tactical 
nuclear weapoll&-6oD'Ie of them anchored 
Into the ground near the frontier and to be 
preparing for a siXty-ninety day conven-
tional war of the World War II variety In 
Europe. 
But still It Is our premise that the Ameri-
can forces must be structured for a long war 
In Europe. Supply and logistic levels of Amer-
Ican troops In Europe are for sixty-ninety 
days, putting an added burden on manpower 
and supplies well beyond the realm of rea-
son.2l . 
But even more significant Is the European 
. reaction to any removal of u:s. troops from 
the Continent. It Is an accepted axiom that 
the Europeans would follow suit and reduce 
their conventional forces as wen.• 
What Ia the threat, then, that requires so 
many U.S. forces on the Continent? If there 
Is a truly perceived tl)reat ot a oonventlonal 
wa.r from the East, would not our European 
allies who are clooer to the "threat" then re-
spond by an accelerated commitment ot re-
sources? But no, they would relax as well. 
accept the detente a and devote more re-
sources to non-military ventures. Then why 
should we, 3,000 miles away, assume such 
arrogance as to perceive a greater threat to 
Europe than do the Europeans? 
I think the question presumes a rational 
answer but there Is none. It does highlight, 
however, the dominance of the military pos-
ture In Europe by the United States. Since 
the !ormation of NATO, there has never been 
a Supreme Allied Comma.nder who was not an 
Amerlcan.'·U.S. perceptions or the threat are 
tolerated by the Europeans and why not-
the u.s. Is tooting the greatest share of the 
cost. Since It Is really our nuclear response 
that the Europeans wish committed, their 
tolerance for our eccentricities--Including 
the World War II conventional war contin-
gency-Is very hlgb. 
Should the unlikely contingency of a mass 
movement by Warsaw Pact forces take place, 
It Is Inconceivable to me that the President 
of the United States would not be In Immedi-
ate contact with his counterpart In the So-
viet Union. In any event, to pile Inconsist-
ency upon Inconsistency, If the NATO mili-
tary scenario calls for a defense of a massive 
move from the East, that move must neces-
sarily come I\Cl"'88 the north German plains, 
the likely area for a swift move because o! 
the terrain. For this conventional attack the 
U.S. forces are stationed In ~he wrong part or 
Germany. The U.S. forces are positioned In 
central and southern Germany within an 
enormous back-up capacity and with a con-
sistently top-heavy cornma.nd structure 
wblch still has one tJag olllcer for roughly 
every 2,200 men. 
It bal!les me why a properly structured U.S. 
military force ot one or at the most two lean, 
mobile dlvls1ons, In position to move rapidly 
along the German frontier, would not be even 
greater lnsura.nce against any !ann of pres-
sure from the ~t. 
It would be more realistic to the type of 
Improbable attack that might conceivably 
come from the East. It would permit Ameri-
can forces to be engaged from the beginning, 
thus allaying any !861'11 on he part of the 
Europeans that the United Statee would not 
be Involved In the event ot a quick •thrust 
Into Westem Europe. 
TID: MlD'II* 
Again and again over the years we have 
been told both by our own omclals and thooe 
In Europe that some decrease In U.S. mllttary 
presence should take place."' 
But the time is never right for such action. 
Two years ago the argument was the policy 
of detente was underway and that nothing 
should be done that would dlarupt the proc-
ess, Including the U.S.-USSR SALT negotia-
tions and the goals envlaloned by Chancel-
lor Brandt's "Ostpolitik." 
Today we find ourselves In a new situation. 
Success has been achieved In the first and 
most Important round of SALT talks; the 
Warsaw and Moscow treaties have been con-
cluded; the status of Berlin has been regular-
Ized; through the exchanges of visits between 
President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev 
a new and better climate has been created 
which allOWB us to talk about the Cold War 
In terms of the past. 
Despite this movement, we are being told 
that this Is the "worst possible time" In 
which to take any action on the question 
ot our forces In Europe. The bargaining chip 
is back'. Negotiations on mutual force reduc-
tions are to begin on October 30th of thls 
year.• 
At the outset we were told by all the ex-
perts that MBFR negotiations will be even 
more complicated and lengthy than the firs t 
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phase of SALT. Most in!ormed and optmistic 
speculations are. that the oU'tcome of such 
negotiations after perhaps two to three years 
might be a reduction of no more than 10--
16% on the part of those countries involved."' 
Nothing hBB happened in the interim since 
President Nixon's letter of November 22, 
1971, which has given us any different picture 
of this argument. Indeed, since the prellml-
ne.ry talks-i.e., talks e.s to whether there 
should be tallts--were expected to take 
roughly five weeks and took about llve 
months, my skepticism has been Increased 
rather than dlmlnlshed about MBPR. I really 
d{)ubt that the United Statee can remaln 1m-
mobilized on the troops question for a mint-
mum or two and possibly even four to five 
years. So the argument to walt for MBl"R 
really Is a postponement of significant action 
tnde!lnttely. 
UNILATERAL ACTION 
The questions of MBl"R are immensely 
compllcated even 1! they were undertaken in 
a bilateral framework. The positioning o! 
forces, the proportionate reduction of one 
side as opposed to the other because of d1!-
!erent loglstlcaJ requirements will generate 
solutions equal to the number of participants 
at the conference. So the complexity o! 
MBF'R Is magnified 19 tlme<s.27 
The wtsdom of the North Atlantic Treaty 
which left the question of speclflc troop 
commitments In the NATO comxnand to be 
decided unlle.terally by each country Is e.ban-
doned in MBFR. Unilateral e.ctlon on such 
a matter Is the only practical method. Any 
nation entering into negotiations whetl'er 
bilateral or multilateral only agrees in those 
negotle.tlons to what she determines uni-
laterally she can do or must do In her own 
national interest. No negotte.tlon wtth the 
Soviet Union would cause the Soviet Union 
to reduce any or ita troops from Eastern Eu-
rope 11 the Soviet Union determines that 
those troops are needed In the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries for other than protection 
against an external threat. In llke manner, 
1f the Soviet Union senses a greater need for 
Ita troope on other frontiers, or 1! she desires 
to divert a greater proportion o( her resources 
to non-military Interests, then the appro-
priate reductions by the USSR wUI be made-
but only then. 
So unilateral action on our part to reduce 
U.S. troops In Europe, whUe stU! malntatn-
lng our commitment with e. more wtsely 
structured but significantly reduced level 
of troops could very well stimulate a si.J:i:lllar 
Independently arrived at response on the 
part o! the Soviet Union. This Is not un-
precedented In recent history. Unilateral and 
Independent actions taken by the United 
States e.nd the Soviet Union for moratoriums 
on nuclear tests In the atmosphere pre-
cipitated eimUe.r constructive Independent 
reeponsee on each side which ultimately led 
to the nuclear test ban treaty. So the a.rgu-
ments that unilateral action cannoot lead to 
constructive responses e.re unwarranted.• 
Unilateral action on the part of the United 
States Inight produce surprising and con-
structive results. What people fall to realize 
Is that the Soviet Union, ever since World 
War II, has not only been acting, but react-
Ing, wtthln Its military establishment. Much 
of the Soviet fOrce was created at a time 
when the United StateS' bad clear nuclee.r 
superiority. Most Informed obeervers, here 
and In Wet;tern Europe, agree that the Soviet 
Union Is considerably more conservative and 
suspicious than the United States because 
of its historical experiences and the charac-
ter of Its society."' 
Yet no one see~ru~ willing to make allow-
ances for the Inertia of this mUI~y con-
servatism In the USSR. We forget that the 
speeches by our NATO Commanders, as well 
as our polltlcal leaders, regarding need for 
NATO strength and readiness a.re read in 
q u1 te a 41fferent light by tbe Sovlet leader-
ship than we Intend. It seems a simple prop-
osition, the.t they t ru.et us ..no more than 
we trust them, but we do nat seem to be able 
to absorb this view and aot up¢n lt. 
Tim FINANCIAL BUBDJ:N 
Mr. Chairman. I have not dwelled upon the 
question o! budgetary drain and balance-Of-
payments costs or our troops stationed over-
seas. I have deliberately left this point to 
one side in considering these questions be-
cause I believe the United States wlll bear 
the necessary costs to fulfill Its international 
obligations. Our history wlll show that I But 
I believe It Is clear that the United States 
can fulfill tts International obligations 
abroad wtth a significant reduction o! U.S. 
forces on foreign soU. 
I believe a focus on this Issue can be gain-
ed at last because of the competition for re-
sources a.t home. But these resouroes wUI be 
saved, hot by trlminlng our salls on our 
lntema.tlonal obligations but by trimming 
the waste !rom years or inattention to a 
rational International policy. 
This Committee Is well aware that the 
overall costs of our cominitment to NATO 
amounts to something In the neighborhood 
of $17 billion, Including everything except 
strategic forces; that the direct annual 
operating costs for the approxlmately 300,-
000 U.S. forces actually located In Europe 
amounts to approximately $4' bUllon;oo that 
the net balance of payments draJn because 
or the U.S. forces In Europe Is approximately 
$1.6 billion annually; and that tbeee figures 
are growing dally because of tbe United 
States' disadvantage because of ln1l&t1on, 
successive devaluations of the dollar and 
other weakenlngs. 
A return to r~>.tlonallty on the part of the 
United States and Its forces abroe.d would 
yield a very slgnlflcant savings in resources 
to the United States. I bave deliberately, 
Mr. Chalrman, not ~>.ddreseed myself to the 
Issue of whether the troops t hat should be 
removed from foreign soU should be demo-
bilized. It Is my opinion that a very sound 
International policy for the United States 
could be Implemented with a reduction of 
110 % of the over 600,000 troops s t ationed on 
foreign soU. 
Tbe return of over 250,000 mUit ary person-
nel would ·reflect the JUdgment that they 
were not needed to fulfill existing Interna-
tional and domestic obligations and there-
fore appropriate for demobilizat ion. But I 
don't t hink t hat the quest ion of demobUiza-
tlon has to be d irectly addressed a.t this time 
since I beUeve t he pressures of obtaining a 
military armed force without the draft w111 
to a. great extent resolve the Issue of demobil-
Ization. 
CON CLUSION 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a 
course of aotlon which I hope you wlll agree 
Is most reasonable an d desirable. I beUeve It 
Is a course that provides the approprte.te 
civilian guidance to our Inllltary leaders and 
gives them sumclent !attitude in adJustiD.g 
for themselves the specific redu ction wblcb 
would stem !rom this proposal. 
I beUeve that we should move In the direc-
tion of a 50 % red uctlon or our total forces 
stationed in all overseas territories. I believe 
tbte reductton should be accompltsbecl wltbln 
a three-year period a.nd In a carefully struc-
tured way which would not necessarily ent aU 
the same pe rcentage reduction In each of the 
three years or In any one area of tbe world, 
but would provide that not less than 26 % 
of tbe total envisioned cut would take place 
in each of t he three years. I prefer to do this 
on a worldwide baste because I beUeve the 
United States Is overextended preciSely on 
that basis. 
Sej:ondly, I would suggest confining the 
cuts to land-ba.sed units In order to permit 
our fieets to operate at approprle.te s trengths, 
but at the saq1e time not excluding bome 
ported naval units from the overall computa-
tion. 
'Finally, I am proposing to leave as much 
discretion to our mUitary commanders as 1B 
commensurate with our foreign policy In-
terests. 
In sum, Mr. Chairman, the wasteful expres-
sion of our external power-expression well 
beyond any reasonable need~as begun to 
erode our Internal freedom. The disclosures 
of recent months n:.lght very well be inter-
preted in part as the methodology of the 
American Empire returning borne to under-
mine the fibre of our republtc.Bl 
I believe we have talked, debated and quar-
reled long enough about tbls whole problem 
of U.S. foreign poUcy as It Is implemented 
abroad. The time for action Is long overdue 
and action Is what I hope this Committee 
w111 recommend. 
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"' Senator On.LE'I'TJ!!. Just one additional 
question. There Is no magic formula in the 
four plus two divisions, as I understand It? 
Secretary MAIIBHALL. It ts just a combina-
tion of considerations that we have bad to 
turn over In our minds. 
Senator On.Lrrls. Taking into considera-
tion a number or factors, the Immediate 
avallabUity of troops and the fact that we 
want to make, In our opinion, a move, take a 
course that will give some reassurance to our 
allies that we are taking Into consideration 
our resources and tbelr avallabl!lty, the roc-
mula of four plus two was reached? 
Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, Sir. 
Senatol' GILLETTE. And there Is nothing 
magic about It? 
Secretary MARSHALL. No, certainly not . . . 
Hearings on "Assignment of Ground Forces 
of t he United States to Duty in European 
Area ," February, 1951, Commit tee on Foreign 
Relat ions and Commit tee on Armed Services, 
U.S . Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st SessiOn. 
lJ Senator HrcKENLOOPER . .. . I do say t o 
you t hat wttbout any doubt In my Inind, the 
North Atlantic Pact proposition was sold to 
a great many Members o! t he Congress on 
the Idea t hat prior to aggression we would 
not be called upon to implement tbe land 
arinies of Westem Europe by large n umbers 
of troops .. . 
Now, may I ask you, bas the policy 
changed, or Is t bts a new proposit ion? Has 
your posit ion changed? Apparently It bas, but 
I would like to have you comment on lt. 
Secretary ACHESON. I shall be glad to com-
m ent on what you have Just stated. 
The question which you asked me was un-
derstood by me e.s It bas Just been under-
stood by Senator Smith, a.nd tha t was wheth-
er, under art icle 3 of the treaty, we were ex-
pected, In the sense of were we undertaking 
a commitment, to send ground troops to Eu-
rope. I replied to you that the answer to t hat 
'Is a clear and absolute "no." We were n ot 
undertaking a commitment by article 3 of 
that treaty to do anytlng except to work with 
our all1es to establish Individual and collec-
tive defense. 
I think It was clearly understood that way 
by the committee, which you wtll remember, 
and I should like to recall to you that that 
committee, In Its report, said, under tbts 
article 3 : 
"Realistic assessment of the defensive ca.-
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paclty necessary to resist armed attack will 
be a function o! the organlza.tlon to be es-
tablished under actlcle 9." 
And It goes on: 
"On the ba.sls of this assessment, each 
party would determine for Itself what It 
could most e!l'ectively contribute In the form 
of facilities, mJllt&ry equipment. production 
cnpa.clty , m&npO"{er. etc. This decision would 
be tak~n In Wle )lght o! the resources and 
!(Cogra.phlca.1 Jocntlon of the Individual state, 
nnd with due regard to Its economic stability. 
There 1s no specUlc obligation as to the tim-
Ing, nature, .and extent of assistance to be 
given by any par<y ." 
That Is exactly In accordance with my 
understanding then nnd now, and that was 
what I thought wns being asked, and to 
that I was respondJng. 
Senator HlCKENLOOPER. I am trying to !lnd 
out whether this is only the camel getting its 
head under the tent, and whE:ther the 4 divi-
sions will require 6 more and then the 10 
will require 12 more, and where we are going, 
wh&t we b&ve to look forward to? In view of 
the fact that we dJd not contemplate sendJng 
any substantial numbers of ground troops to 
tmp1emeni the North Atlantic Treaty, and 
now the scenes have shifted and we are being 
edged In, not by the back door but by the 
front <1oor, with divisions of troops which 
at least I did not contemplate we were going 
to send or Intended to send, I am wondering 
where the end of this matter Is. In the long 
run will we be put Into the Inevitable posi-
tion ot a.ssumJng the primary responstbll1ty 
tor the land defense of Europe. I am concern-
ed a.s to whether or not we are gong to get 
ouraelves In that position by this piecemeal 
attrition method, or whether our commit-
menta an land forces at the moment meet 
our reasonable obligations under the defense 
program a.s It Is now contemplated. 
Seol'et&ry AcJmSoN. Senator, I think you 
are ,aak!D4f me quite Impossible questions. I 
do not know. In the flrst place, you say, Are 
we going to be aalted to take over the land 
defenae of Europe? The answer Is, of course, 
we are not going to be asked to take over 
the def'ense; the land defense of Europe. I! 
you ask me whether In the future we may 
be aeked to send more than six divisiOns, 
how can I possibly answer that? I auppoae 
It tbere Is war you wUl. Maybe 11 the situa-
tion gets better It will be less. Maybe 11 It 
stays the same It will be the same. Maybe· I.'! 
It gets IJlOI'e tense, there may be some addi-
tions to it. Op.~t. 
u Senator SMITB (N.J.). Now, the Immedi-
ate queetlon I want to a.sk you Is this: Are 
we buJ.ldlng up this European Army by put-
tl04f our divisions there at the moment, ln. 
order to deter an aggression whUe they are 
getting their strength buUt up. Will the time 
oome when they wm be a.ble to defend them-
selves entirely without our aid so far a.s Eu-
rope Is concerned? 
In other words, can we look upon thla a.s 
a. gNdUally reducing contribution to the 
European Army of our United States· forces, 
&S we d1d on the Marshall plan from an eco-
rwmlc standpoint? W& started subate.ntlally 
and reduced untU we do not h&ve to give 
any more. 
Now, Is our support, ground support, of a 
Western European army on the same prin-
ciple? Is It on the principle of giving them 
strength and giving them courage to go 
ahead and set up their force, but as they get 
their own strength we wlll gradually with-
draw from there and keep our forces mobUe 
tor any part of the world where they may 
strike? 
General BRADLEY. I think the question of 
whether a mUitary contribution to Europe 
would be a decrea.slng one Is almost an Im-
possible one to answer at this time. So much 
depends upon the making of a peace treaty 
with Germany and the state ot preparedneM 
of the other nations, the continued aggres-
sive moves on the part of other nations th&t 
are presently opposed to us, and their Ideol-
ogy, I think, Senator Smith, that Is a rather 
long-range question to which any answer 
at this time would not be worth much. 
Senator SMITH (N.J.). The only reason I 
asked you the question Is because I under-
stood In talking with General Eisenhower 
that he thought we might think In tenns 
of an approach similar to the Marshall plan 
!rom an economic standpoint: that what we 
are trying to do uow Is trying to put spirit 
Into the European nations that may be fear-
ful that we are uot giving them support. They 
need It now more than they wlll a little later. 
General BRADLEY. I think that Is true. They 
need It possibly more now. And, 1t you can 
look far enough ahead to the time when 
France has 60 or 60 divisions and those other 
countries have simUar size forces, the time 
mlght arrive when we could withdraw our 
forces altogether, and certainly when you get 
a peace treaty with Germany you are going 
to be faced with the question of reduction 
of forces, because some of these people are 
on occupation duties now; but that ap-
parently · Is sometime In the future, and I 
would prefer not to try to answer your ques-
tion, which In my opinion Ia based on condi-
tions which a.re going to exist a conslder111ble 
time In the future, and I can perceive of 
circumstances being possible which would 
permit ua to withdraw entirely, but I say 
that Is certainly &oing to be sometime otr. 
Op. cit. 
,. See Appendix D. 
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"'Events !rom 1963 to 1973 which slgn111.-
cantly contributed to the lessening o! ten-
sions between East and West: 
1. Renewal of Franoo-&>vlet trade agree-
ment. February 1963. 
2. U.S.-USSR agreement to establish an 
emergency co=unlcattona Une (hot line). 
June 1963. · 
3. Tripartite treu.ty banning nuclear weap-
ons tests In the atmosphere, In outer space, 
and under water. October 1983. 
ol. Approval by President Kennedy of U.S. 
wheat sales to th~ USSR. October 1963. 
5. U.S.-USSR II@TOOment of exchanges In 
the sclentl.flc, technical, educational, cul-
~ural, and other ~Ids. Pebruary 1964. 
6. U.S. restores MFN treatment to Yugo-
slavia and Polan<l, March 1964. 
7. Renewal of U.S.-USSR trade agreement. 
April 1964. 
6. U.S. Romanian trade dlsci.UIS!ons. May 
1964. 
9. U.S.-USSR coDBular agreement. Signed 
June 1964. Ra.tl.fled March 1967. 
10. French-Soviet trade agreement. Sep-
tember 1964. 
11. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation In 
desalination of sea water. November 1964. 
12. Warsaw Pact Pol1tlcal Consultative 
Committee approval of the Ra.packl sugges-
tion for a conference on European security, 
Janue.ry 1965. 
13. Franco-Soviet color television agree-
ment. March 1966. . 
14. Italo-Soviet agreement on joint co-
operation In peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
October 1965. 
15. U.S.-USSR consulllll' convention. De-
cember 1965. 
16. Italo-Soviet cultural agreement. Feb-
ruary 1966. 
17. Italo-Sovlet eoonomlc, sclentlflc, and 
technlca.1 cooperation agreement. AprU 1966. 
18. Yugoslavia becomes full contracting 
party to OA'IT. AprU 1966. 
19. De Gaulle's vls1t to the USSR. June 
1966. 
20. Franco-Soviet apace research agree-
ment. June 1966. 
21. PranccrSovlet sclent111.c, technlca.1, and 
economic agreement. June 1966. 
22. Plat-SoVI.et agreement for construc-
tion of a Plat factory In RUBS1a. August 
1966. 
23. Renault and Peugeot agreements with 
the USSR regarding cooperation with Soviet 
motor Industry. October 1966. 
24. Koeygln's vlalt to France. December 
1966. 
25. Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet 
permanent commission. December 1966. 
27. Establishment of joint Franco-Soviet 
chAmber of commerce. December 1966. 
28. North Atlantic Ministerial Council 
declaration emphaslzl.ng a wllllngness to 
explore ways of developing cooperation with 
the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe. 
December 1966. 
29. Franco-Soviet atomic energy coopera-
tion agreement. January 1967. 
30. Franco-Soviet trade agreement. Janu-
ary 1967. 
31. Kosygln vls11o to the United Kingdom. 
February 1967. 
32. Fanfanl vlslt to Moecow. May 1967. 
33. Italo-Soviet agreement on cooperation 
In tourism. May 1967. -
34. Italo-Sovlet consular convention. May 
1967. 
35. Poland becomes full contracting mem-
ber of OA'IT. June 1967. 
36. U.K.-USSR establish London-Moscow 
teleprinter line. August 1967. 
37. Harmel Report of North Atlantic Coun-
cU proposes discussion of mutUal and bal-
anced force reductions In Central Europe. 
December 1967. 
38. Announcement of plans for Joint 
Franco-Soviet space re&ee.l'ch. January 1968. 
39. Prime Minister Wilson's visit to the 
USSR. January 1968. 
40. U.K.-USSR sclent111.c and technological 
agreement. 
41. NATO declaration calling tor discus-
sions of mutual an<l be.lanced force reduc-
tions. June 1968. 
<12. Signature of the non-proliferation 
treaty on nuclear weapons. July 1968. 
43. Natural gas delivery contract consum-
mated between the State of Bavaria e.nd the 
USSR. September 1968. 
· 44. U.K.-USSR c1vll air agreement. Decem-
ber 1969. 
45. Franco-Soviet clvU •1r agreement. De-
cember 1969. 
46. ltalo-Sovlet long-term agreement on 
the supply of Soviet natural gas to Italy. 
December 1969. · 
47. Soviet-West German agreements on 
supply of Soviet natural gas to West Ger-
many. February 1970. 
48. Opening In Vletnna of U.S.-USSR nego-
tiations on strategic arms ltmltatlon (SALT). 
April 1970. 
49. NATO declaration on mutual and bal-
anced force reductions. May 1970. 
60. Signing of non-aggression treaty be-
tween the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Soviet Union. August 1970. 
51. Prooident Pompldou'a vlalt to the USSR. 
October 1970. 
62. Signing of Franco-Soviet protocol on 
Franco-Bovlet political cooperation. Octo-
ber 1970. 
53. Signing of treaty of normallza.tlon of 
relations between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Poland. December 1970. 
64. Creation of a new basts for SALT nego-
tiations. May 1971. 
55. Ouster o! ha.rd-llne E&.st German Com-
munist leader, Walter Ulbricht. May 1971. 
66. Resumption of SALT negotiations. July 
1971. 
57. Soviet-West German agreement to open 
consulates In Hamburg and Leningrad. July 
1971. 
58. Signature of flrst part of quadripartite 
agreement on Berlin. September 1971. 
59. Chancellor Brandt's vlslt to the USSR. 
September 1971. 
60. U.S.-USSR agreement on exchanging 
ln!ormatlon on certa1n missile test1rig activi-
ties. September 1971. 
61. U.S.-USSR agreement on Improving the 
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"hot llne" between Washington and Moscow. 
September 1971. 
62. Secretary Brezbnev's visit to France. 
October 1971. 
63. Franco-Soviet agreement on economic, 
technical and lnd\Uitrtal cooperation. Octo-
ber 1971. 
64. Romania becomes a full contracting 
party to GATT. November 1971. 
65. Soviet-West German clvU air agree-
ment. November 1971. 
66. Ratlll.cation by the West German par-
llament of the West German treaties wi~ 
the Soviet Union and Poland. May 1972. 
67. President Nixon's visit to Moscow. May 
1972. 
68. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation 
In the ezploratlon of outer space May 1972. 
69. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation 
In solving problems of the environment May 
1972. 
70. U.S.-USSR agreement on joint elforts 
In the ll.eld of medical science and public 
heiLlth. MAy 1972. 
71 . U.S.-USSR agreement on expanded co-
operation In science and technology and tbe 
establishment of a joint commission for this 
purpose. MAy 1972. 
7:1. U.S.-USSR agreement on cooperation 
between the American and Soviet navies to 
reduce the chances of dangerous Incidents. 
May 1972. 
73. Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972. 
74. Signing of the ll.nal quadripartite agree-
ment on Berlin. June 1972. 
75. U.S.-USSR three year agreement on the 
export of U.S. agricultural commodities (es-
pecially wheat and feed grains). July 1972. 
76. Settlement of USSR lend-lease obllga-
tlons.OCtober 1972. 
77. U.S .-USSR maritime agreement. Octo-
ber 11172. 
78. Signing of U.S.-USSR Commercial 
treaty. October 1972. 
79. Quadripartite declaration supporting 
Eaet and West German membership In the 
United Natlona. November 1972. 
80. Signing of the baste treaty on relatione 
between the Jl'ederal Republic of Oerme.ny 
and the German Democratic Repub1lo. De-
cember 197:1. 
81. Opening of preparatory talks In VIenna 
for negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions. January 1973. 
82. Soviet-West German 10-year agreement 
on the development of economic. Industrial, 
and technical cooperation. and cultural and 
educational exchanges. MAy 1973. 
" Hearings on "Assignment of Ground 
Forces of the United States to Duty In the 
European Areas;" February, 1951, Committee 
on Foreign Relations and Committee on 
Armed Services, u .s .a ., 82nd, let Bess. 
n "Saturday Evening Post," October 26, 
1973, page 27. 
,. Houae Forelgtl Affairs Hearings, July, 
1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Bess. 
"It was with disbelief that I read the 
newspaper reports of President Nixon's re-
cent visit with President Pompldou of France 
In Iceland and the reports that President 
Pompldou told President Nixon that France 
would fl.ght the removal of any U.S. troops 
from Europe, even It done In the context of 
the so-called "MBFR." 
Here Is the President or one of the great 
countries of Western Europe which removed 
ILl! their b'oopa from the NATO Command In 
1967 which has refused to participate In the 
mUitary aepects of NATO since that time, 
which responded very early to the changed 
circumstances of Europe-Its political and 
economic health vis-a-vis the East, telling 
the President of the United States that 
France would protest the removal of any 
American troops from the NATO Command In 
Europe. 
It Is statements of this character that 
makes one wonder about the viability of U.S. 
European policy on forces In Europe. "Wash-
Ington Poet," June 1. 1973; June 28, 1973. See 
also Addreas by Michel Jobert, French Minis-
ter of Foreign Alfalrs, Before the National 
Assembly, June 19, 1973. 
.. ··The MUitary Balance 1972-1973." In-
ternational Institute of Strategic Studies. 
London, England, pg. 90. See also Testimony 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcom-
mittee on MU!tary Appllco.tlons, AprU 16,' 
1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Sees. 
""The NATO military objectives are 
deterrence and defence. Yet NATO, and the 
United States In particular , maintain all-
purpose, onens!ue-orlented, expeditionary-
style forces that do not provide the desired 
deterrence because of their low initta.l combat 
ce.pabU!ty and their destabUizlng tactical 
nuclear posture. A force structure oriented 
for deterrence and defence can be bought at 
much less than present cost--as Soviet force& 
In East Germany prove. Adjusted (equal 
front-line platoon strength, dell.ned as In-
fantry, tank, cavalry, and anti-tank) peace-
time division slices (the division Itself plus 
Its share of non-divisional support personnel) 
total approximately 42,000 for American 
forces tn We,t Germany; but cmly 18,500 for 
Soviet force,." "The WastefUl Ways of 
NATO," Steven L. C&nby, Sun>!val, Vol. XV, 
No. 1, Jan.-P'eb., 1973, IMtltute Strategic 
Studies, London, England. 
"Testimony of Secretary Rush, House 
Foreign Alf&lrs, July 10, 1973, 93rd Congress, 
1st Sees. 
"Testimony of Administration witnesses, 
Hou6e Foreign Alfalrs, July 10, 11, 12, 1973, 
93rd Congress, 1st Bess. 
" Most recent statement of Secretary of 
Defense Schlesinger that the U.S. Is doing 
more than Its !air share In Europe. House 
Foreign Alfalrs, July 1973, 93rd Congress, 
1st Bess. 
• I use the famUiar abbreviation, MBFR, 
throughout, even though the more proper 
abbreviation since the preliminary talka Ia 
MFR. See : Final Communique of Preparatory 
Consultations. 
., The communique announcing the In-
tention to meet on October 30th Issued by 
the countries Involved managed to loae the 
word "balance." When the Senate last voted 
on a proposed amendment to reduce U.S. 
forces In Europe, the dlstlngulahed Chairman 
ot the Armed Services Oommlttee received 
a letter from President NiXon st.&tlng his op-
position to the amendment partly on the 
grounds that "we expect tbat Mr Broslo 
will be received In Moscow next week to be-
gin dlscuaslons on basic lasues of mutual and 
balanced force reductions." 
I do not mysolf doubt that this letter 
from the President naturally had great 
weight with our colleagues. But Mr Broslo 
never got to Moscow and preliminary dls-
cuaslons on MBFR did not begin until this 
past January, 14 months after that letter. 
., "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tions," Library of Congreas Study, 73-36F, 
February 2, 1973. 
77 There are 19 countries participating In 
MBFR. See Appendix E. 
18 I only wish that the classic argument of 
doing things In unison with the Soviet Union 
would be applied when It comes to the sta-
tioning of U.S. forces on foreign soil. Accord-
Ing to ll.gures published by the International 
Institute of Strategic .Studies, the Soviet 
Union has about 16,000 troops stationed 
outside of Soviet territory and Eastern Eu-, 
rope, whereas the United States has about 
300,000 military forces scattered around the 
world, out.slde the U.S. and Europe. A 
parity with the Soviet Union In this area. 
would be a significant and constructive start 
towards bringing America home again. 
In Its Eastern European satellltes. USSR 
has stationed 330,000 USSR troops. See New 
York Times, July 20, 1973. The total USSR 
troops outside of Soviet soli Is therefore 
346.000. 
"'See Louis J . Halle, The Cold War as His-
tory (New York 1967). 
10 Testimony of WU!lam J. Casey, Under 
House Alfalrs Committee, July 12, 1973, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Bess. 
"' See David P . C&lleo, Th.e Atlantic Fantasy 
(Johns Hopkins PreBB 1970). 
APPENDIX A 
U.S. Mn.ITUY STRENGTH 0UTIUDE THE UNITED 
STATES As OF MARCH 31, 1973 
Total OUtside the Unfted 
States ---~--------------- 606,000 
U.S. Territories and Poslleaslons___ 42, 000 
Foreign Countries--------•-------- 56-l. 000 
Selected Areas, Southeast 
Asia --------------------- 63.000 
ThaUand ------------------------- 45, 000 
Afioat -----------~--------------- 18,000 
VVestern Paclll.c ------------- 164,000 
Japan ------------------------C--
PhUippinea ----------------------
Ryultyus Ialanda------------------
South Korea----------------------
Taiwan --------------------------
Afloat ---------------------------
Other Areas ----------------
Bermuda ------------------------
Canada --------------------------
Cube. ----------------------------
Cluam ---------------------------Panama Canal Zone _____________ _ 
Puerto RICO-----------------------
AII.oat ----------------------------
Other ----------------------------
Western Europe and Related 
18, 000 
15,000 
40,000 
42,000 
9.000 
40,000 
66,000 
1, 000 
2,000 
3,000 
17,000 
10,000 
7,000 
16,000 
10,000 
Areas -------------------- 313, ooo 
Belgium -------------------------
Germany ------------------------
Iceland --------------------------
Italy -----------------------------
Greece ___ ------------------------
~orocoo -------------------------
Netherlands ----------------------
Portugal ------ --------------------
Spain ---------------------------
Turkey --------------------------United Kingdom _________________ _ 
Afioat ---------------------------
Other ----------------------------
LESS THAN 250 
2,000 
228,000 
3,000 
10,000 
3,000 
1, 000 
2,000 
2, 000 
9 , 000 
7 , 000 
21,000 
23,000 
2,000 
Antarctica, Bahamas, Bahrain, Lee}Yard 
Islands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, 
South VIetnam. 
LESS THAN 1,000 
Australia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greenland, 
Iran, Johnston Island, Midway Island. 
All other countries: Less than 100 u.s. 
military personnel. 
OSAD (COMPTROLLER). 
Directorate for Information Operations. 
U.S. MILITARY STRli.NGTH 0UTsioE THE UNITED 
STATES AS or DECEMBER Slt 1972 
Total Outside the United 
States ------------------- 635, 000 
U.S. Territories and POBse8Sions____ 42,000 
Foreign Countries _________________ 593, 000 
.Belected Areas, Southeast 
Asia --------------------- 97, 000 
South VletnaDl ___________________ 24,000 
Thailand ------------------------ 43, 000 
Afloat --------------------------- 30, 000 
Western Paclll.c ------------ 162,000 
Japan --------------------------- 20,000 
Philippines ---------------------- 16, ooo 
Ryukyus Islands------------------ 42.000 South Jrorea ________________ __ ____ 38, 000 
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U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
STATES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1972--Cont. 
Other ------------ --------------- 13,000 United Kingdom__________________ 21,000 
Afloat --------------------------- 24,000 
Taiwan ----------~------- ------- 9, 000 
Afloat --------------------------- 38,000 
Western Europe and Related 
Areas ~----------------- - 307, 000 
Other --------------- - ----------- 3,000 
LESS THAN 250 
Other Areas ___ ____________ _ 69,000 
1, 000 
2, 000 
3,000 
1, 000 
Belgium -------------------------
Germany ~-----------------------
2,000 
221", 000 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Johnston Island. Lee-
ward Islands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi 
Arabia. Bermuda ____________ • ___ _______ _ Iceland ________ __ ---------------- 3,000 
10,000 
3,000 
1 , 000 
2 , 000 
1, 000 
9,000 
LESS THAN 1,000 
Canada _____________ ____ _ --------
Italy ----------------------------- Antarctica, Australia, Cyprus, Greenland, 
Iran, and Midway Island. Cuba ---------------------------- Greece _ ----- ____ ---------------_ 
Ethiopia ------------------------- Morocco _______ ------------------ All other countries: Less than 100 U .S . 
military personnel. 
Ouatll ____ ---------------------- 17,000 
10. 000 
6,000 
16,000 
Netherlands ____________________ _ 
Panama Canal Zone ______________ _ 
Portugal ----- - -------------------Puerto Rico . __________ ________ __ _ 
Spain __ - - ----- - _ -~- ------------- OASD (COMPTROLLER )' 
Directorate for Information Operations. Afloat --------------------------- Turkey ____ ---------_______ - - ---- 7, 000 ' 
APPENDIX B 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE- MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS .LOCATED IN ALASKA, HAWAII, U.S. TERRITORIES, AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, AS OF SEPT. 30, 1972 
Total .... ________ __ ___________ 
Alask•-------------------------·---Hawaii. ............... _. ___________ 
U.S.19rrltori03 .......... ____ __ 
Guam ___ _______________ _____ ____ __ _ 
Johnaltln Island .............. ______ _ 
Midway Island ............. ________ _ 
Panoma Canol Zone ............... . . . 
Puerto Rico ........................ _ 
Somoa (American) .... _______ .... .. 
Vlrfl)n l1l1nds.. .................... . 
Wa~. lsllnd ............ -- -- --. . 
Forelan countries and areas_ •• _ 
Af1h1nlston ............... ....... . 
Araentlno·. _ ..................... .. 
Australia .... _ .. ___ .. ____ ____ __ __ 
Austrl1 ..... ----------- ----
Bohomn • -- ---------------------
Bahrain . ------------------------- -
Borbados .................. ___ ... 
Belaium .. ------------------ - ---
Bermuda __ -----------------------
Bolivll ----------------------------Brazil ............ _____________ _ 
Burma ••. __ .···--- - --- .•••••••••• _. 
Cambodia .. _ ----------------------
Canada _ .. _ ..................... . 
Canory Islands .... _ ................ _ 
Cape Verde Islands _________________ _ 
Chile. ____ •••• ___ ............. __ .. .. 
Colombia ...... __ •••• _ ...... _ •• _ ... . 
Con10 (Brauaville) ____ __________ ___ _ 
Costa Rica ..... _____ ...... _________ _ 
Cuba. ___ ..................... _ .. .. 
Cyprus ........ _________ ___________ _ 
Czechoslovokia ..... _ .. ___________ __ • 
Denmark •• ______ ._. _____________ __ _ 
Dominican Republic _________________ _ 
Ecuador ___ • _________ ___ __________ _ 
El Salvador ___________________ ____ __ 
Ethiop1a (includml Eritrea) __________ _ 
~~~1:c"ed_._-_: ~ :: ~£ :::::::::::::::::::: 
Germany (includina West Berlin) _____ _ 
Ghana ..................... ___ .... .. 
Gibrlltlr ••• _________ ..... ________ __ 
Greece (lncludtna Crete) ............ .. 
Guatemola ... . . __ ... _______________ _ 
H~nduras ••• -------~-- -- ---------- -
Hone Kong ........................ . 
Hunaary ................... - •.• ---- -
Iceland ..... --------------------- --
lndtl . _ •.• -------- - ---- __ ___ _ _ 
t ndoneslo. _ ••...• _ •.• _ .•.• _ ..• _ ••. • 
Iran .... _ ...... ............... : . 
lroland (Eire) . ------ ----------- ---
:~~~Y·~~~1u~~~~\/J1~n~~!rdinia5 :: :: 
Ivory Coast_ ••• ________ ••••• __ ••••. -
Jama•ca ... _. --------. ____ . ___ __ _ _ 
Japan ..•. ------------------ --- - -
Jordan . ---- ----- ----- .. ----- --
t<Anya ••• • ••• -------------------
laos. ---------------- -------------lebanon ..... _. ___ • __ ___ .... _______ _ 
Leeward Islands__ _______________ __ __ 
L1bena •• _____ .. ____________________ _ 
lulemboura. _________ ____ ___ ~ _-- ---
Malawi.. ... ____ .. ------------------
~=~~r~ ~t·:~~ ~~==:: :::::::::::::::: 
Marshall Islands ......... _ .... _ .... . 
Mex1co. __________ ._ _____________ ----
Morocco _______ --------- -- ----- ----
~:r~!riinds.-~::: :::::::::: :::::::: : 
Netherland Antilles ......... ---------
New Zealand ..... -------------------
Total dependents 
NaMa~~~~ 
Army Corps 
A1r 
Force 
Dependents of active duty military personnel 
DOO 
total Army 
Marine 
Navy Corps 
Air 
Force 
Dependents of U.S. citizen civilian employees • 
DOO 
total Army Navy 
OSD-JCS 
and other 
Fo~~~ a:~~j~~~ 
465, 779 170, 683 9!, 356 202, 950 437, 198 . 155,648 69, 547 14, 395 197)608 28, 581 15,035 7, 414 5, 342 790 
36,915 14,985 I, 430 
63, 451 14, 182 31, 197 
20, 491 34, 557 13, 905 I, 158 
17.964 60,410 13,091 20,327 
64 
9, 028 
19,430 
17,964 
2, 358 
3, 041 
1,080 
1,091 
208 I, 061 
I, 832 ........ .. 
9 
118 
31, 342 6, 946 11, 296 12, 906 
12, !53 12 7, 149 
17 ................. .. 
4, 987 
17 
9 
4. 421 
3. 471 
742 ---------- 733 
12, 299 6, 934 75S 
6, 089 ......... 2,61~ 
26 -------- - 26 
14 ---------- 15 
I .............. . 
334, 071 134,570 47, ~43 151, 589 
17 
46 
17 .. ................ .. 
I, 24, 
42 38 
152 ........ 
246 ----------
85 
3,039 1. 795 
1. !27 ------- -- -
118 lJJ 
170 28 
12 . 
21 25 
623 613 
1 3 
152 ---------· 
246 ----------
85 ------ ----
200 I. 014 
I, 127 ........ .. 
! 4:. 
64 46 
~ ----------
6 • 
3, 190 __________ 674 ---T498-
3 ---------- 3 ----------
4 ---~-- --- 4 ----------
39 ---------- 19 12 
98 50 16 19 
2 2 --------------------
23 17 3 ----------
1,215 ---------- I, 2!5 ----------
282 5 277 ------- ---
4 I 3 ----------
69 19 16 31 
81 26 43 9 
41 18 II ----------
28 3 5 16 
1, 160 591 468 101 
39 25 14 ----------
190 120 56 14 
151, 019 103, 180 I , 579 46, 102 
7 7 ----------------- ---
1,326 16 I, 310 • ---------
2, 237 131 51 2, 051 
988 84 886 18 
34 22 -----' . - 7 
64 17 47 ----------
8 7 I ----------
2, 087 ______ ... I. 425 662 . 
57 23 28 . 6 
50 5 45 ------ ·--
770 287 24 454 
509 15 476 18 
21 II 10 ......... . 
14, 209 3, 101 4, 790 6, 318 
7 . 5 2 ----------
9 -- -------- 9 ......... . 
23, 976 4, 751 8, 504 10, 701 
14 4 I 9 
3 ---------- 3 ----------
28 18 10 ----------
85 54 27 I 
115 ------ ---- 115 ----------
62 36 26 ----------
4! 39 2 ----------
12 II I ----------
32 24 7 ----------
10 ---------- 10 ----------
33 29 --------------------
87 ---------- 81. --------- -
2,073 34 I, 982 57 
5 5 --------------------
2, 790 635 34 2, 121 
3 --------- - 3 ----------
316 5 m 1110 
28, 121 6, 012 8, 848 618 12,643 3, 221 934 I, 830 263 194 
10,645 1a 5,473 173 4,987 1, 508 _________ _ I-,503 __________ 5 
17 ------------'------·------·--- 17 --------------------------··----------------------
723 · ____ ----- 714 ---------- 9 19 ---------- 19 --------------------
10. 948 6, 000 533 106 4, 309 1, 351 934 116 112 189 
5, 746 .......... 2,114 312 3, 320 343 ---------- 192 !51 -------- -
26 .... .. --- 7 19 ----------------···----------------------------------------
15 _____ ,___ 7 8 -----------------------------------------------------------
1 --------------.. ...... .. I --- ----------------------------------------------
m,llO-· 122,640 =39:214= =-.:sss=w-.--;n~ 19, gslR930 3, 544 4, 018 469 
17 17 .... -----.-.- ...... ... --- ... -------- .. ------------------------------------------
46 ---- - ---- 14 7 25 ------- --- ------------------------------------ ----
1,221 5 588 15 613 20 ---------- 29 ----------- ----- ----
41 37 ------------ I 3 I I ------------------------------152 ---------- 152 __________ _____ ______ ___ __ ____ _______________________________ __ .. ___ ,. 
246 ---------- 237 9 ------------------------------------------------------------
85 ---------- 85 ---.---------------------- -·. ------------------------- .. ------------ .. 2,792 1,578 186 14 1,014 247 217 __________ ____ ______ Jn 
732 ------ ---- 680 52---------- 395 ---------- 395 ................... -
99 53 .......... 1 45 19 10 ------------------ 9 
115 6 54 9 46 55 22 1 ---------- 32 
12 3 4 5 ------------------------------------------------------------
6 3 3 -------------------------- --------- ------------------------ -----------3,047 __________ 561 50 2,436 143 __________ 63 62 18 
3 -·--------- --------- 3 ------------------------------------------------------------
4 ------------------- - 4-------- --- .. --------------------------------- - ------.. -- - ---
31 ---------- 12 7 12 8 ------------------------------ 8 
72 37 8 8 19 26 13 ---- ---------------- 13 
2 2 -- .. --------------------- .. ------------- --------------------- -------------------
17 14 ---------- 3 ---------- 6 3 -------------------- 3 
1, 054 ------- --- 881 173 _________ , 161 ---------- 161 ---------- -------- --
282 5 ,208 69 ------------------------------------------------------------
4· I ---------- 3 ------------------------ - -----------------------------------
66 19 13 3 31 3 --------- ----- ---------------- 3 
75 23 31 12 9 6 3 ---- ---------------- 3 
13 2 6 5 --------- - 28 16 -------------------- 12 
21 -------------------- 5 !6 7 3 -------------------- 4 
1,149 580 461 7 101 II II ------------------------------
39 25 II 3 ---------------------------------------------------- --------
170 101 51 5 13 20 19 ---------- I ----------
143, 580 97, 067 1, 406 144 44,963 7, 439 6, 113 29 I , 139 158 
7 7 --------------.. ----------------.. ----- - -.. ---------.. --------.. ----------------
1, 323 13 I, 310 -----------.------- - 3 3 -------------------------- -- --
2,048 105 ---------- Z3 1, 920 189 26 28 13.1 4 
988 84 881 5 18 ---------------------------------------------------
25 18 ---------------- ---- 7 9 4 -------------------- 5 
64 17 33 14 ------- ------ ---- --- ------- ---- -----------------------------
8 7 1 ---------------- --- ----- ---- - - -------------------------------- -------· 
I, 990 .......... I, 295 33 662 97 ......... : 97 ............... .. 
57 23 22 6 6 ______________ _____ .. _______ ------------------
7~ 28~ ~~ ------ - ~~-------454' ------·-s-·-------c::::::::::::::::::::--· ... ·5 
509 15 470 6 18 -- --------- ------------------------------ ----
21 11 8 2 ........ --------- ------- ................ . 
13,324 2. 6~2 4, 322 171 6, 219 885 489 297 99 ----- -
7 5 ......... . 2 ------------- -------- -----------..................... . 
21. 6~ ---Tsji- 6, ~ 1. 24~ --· io:3jr---·uh _______ aao _____ i:o47 .... · J:io .. - 2o 
14 4 .......... I 9 ....................................... . 
3 -------------------- 3 --------- -- ----------- ---- ------------------------- . 
28 18 9 1 --------------------------------------------------
79 51 14 13 I 6 3 .................... 3 
115 ---------- 115 ------------------- ------------------------- --------------- ---------.-
62 36 20 6 ------------------------------------------------------------
7 5 ---------- 2 --------- - 34 34 --------- ---------------------
12 II ------.... I .. ------------------------------------- ______ .. ----- _ ....... n _____ __ ~~-------- iii' ______ --~ .:::::::::: ________ ~-::::::::::::::: :::: ::::: :::: :-: ______ ___ ~ 
2 2 ---------- ------------------- 31 Z7 -------------------- 4 
' 81 ---------- 48 33 ---------- 6 ------------------------------ 6 
I, 9&g I~ ---- ~~ -------~~--------~~--------~--------~~ --------~~-:::::: : ::::::::: :::: 
2, 671 601 26 8 2, 036 119 34 ---------- 85 ----------
3 --- ------- 3 -----------------------------·------------------------------- .... -----316 5 123 8 180 ____________ : ____________ ______ __________________ _ 
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Nicaraaua. ___ • ------ --- ------------
Ntaeua •• ----- ------ ---------- -----
Norway •.. --·················--···· 
Poklston .•. ___ --··-··· · ·····-· 
Panama, RepubliC of.. .•••••..•.•••.. 
Paraauay __ • __ --- - - ----------·-
Peru. ---------------- ---------
Phihpptnes.... --------- .. ----
Poland .••• • ···--·-·· · · ·· ···-· Portua•l (udud1n1 Azoros)... ______ _ 
Rumama . . • • ••• _ - -----
Ryukyu Islands ... 
~audt Arabtl .••• ------------- •• 
Senegal • _ -- - ----------------
~~~:ftoR~PUbili: .. __ ::::: .: _ = ~:: ::::: 
South Afnca ••.•...••....••... .•.••. 
South Korea ..•••• • · · -····· ·--· ··-· 
South Voetnam •.•..••.• '-···· ··-··-· 
Spain •...• -----············-·· · · ··· Sri Lonka (Coylon) _______ __ ______ __ _ 
Sweden .....• _ ........ ---·-· 
Switzerland ___ ••......••. __ •... 
Ta1wan. __ __ __ .. --.•• ---- .----------
Thoitand. _ •. _ .•••...••••. ------- ---
Tnnidad ond Tobaao ..•...•••....•.•• Tunisia ____________________________ _ 
Turkey _ ..•.. . . .. -········-··· 
Umted Arab Republoc (E&ypt) ...•..... 
Un1ted Kinadorr> ••.••...••.... ·-·· ·-· 
Uruguay ________ .-- ----------------
U.S.S.R (Sov1et Unl<ln) .•..•. . . ... •••• 
Venezuela.----_____ ----------------
Yuaosfovio ...••.•• •••...••..... ___ _ _ 
Zoiro (Cool!>) .•••...••••... _ .•...... 
Und1stributod ••....••... -.••... --.-. 
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Total dependents 
DOD 
toto I 
"·:r.:.~: Air 
Force Army Corps 
2 8 
2 --········ 
46 32 
29 27 
502 113 49 sco 
12 5 4 3 
32 641 
293 19 
13 8 
7, 900 11, 978 
7 . .••. 
404 z. 392 
7 • 
2. 270 I, 594 
355 27 
34 ····-· ··· · 20, 040 154 
18 11 
2.152 !>6 
14 7 
25, 860 9, 538 
86 60 
2, 063 14, 259 
4 22 
U ·---- 2.i" 12 · ·-···-··· 45 6 
2 2 ------
22 8 i4.:.:·:·--
4, 296 2, 820 
20 I 
227 I, 239 
13 6 
13, 282 332 
10 · ·····-·-· 
4, 840 8, 102 
10 ·•• ••·•· 30 21 9 ······---· 
26 13 13 .....• 
5, 853 822 
4, 202 I, 816 
18 ----------
983 3, 977 
284 2, 084 
18 ·-····· .. 
36 8 7 21 
7, 216 831 
36 ······--·· 
30, 668 713 
24 ······-- . 
49 21 
157 6, 228 
36 ··- -····· 
2, 930 27, 013 
11 13 
Z5 ••••••• • 
77 13 23 Z2 
29 20 9 -----·· -· 
76 48 1 27 
68 6 48 14 
Dependents of Ktlve duty military personnel Dependents of U.S. citizen civtlian employees t 
OSD- JCS 
and other 
DOD 
total 
Marine 
Corps 
Air 
force 
DOD 
total 
Air defense 
Army flavy Army Navy Force actl'ltttes 
37 27 ····------ 2 8 9 5 ·····-·· · ···-······· 
29 27 ·····----- 2 - ------········································-
489 100 !9 10 340 I! 13 ···•·•·····•·•··· .. 
12 5 4 ··· ····-·· 3 ....... - -- ------ ---- ----------------
2.051 I, 410 .•••.•.. . . 32 609 219 184 . ......•.. 32 3 
326 14 286 7 19 29 IS ··········· ------ 16 
21 •••• •••. •• 8 5 8 13 .••••... .•....... -· ···· ··- _ 13 
19, 095 148 6, 905 369 11, 673 945 6 626 305 8 
18 11 5 2 ·····-··-······---- · ········-······-·--······ - -·-·----
2, 652 53 351 3 z. 255 190 3 50 137 ---
22,8~~ 7, 07~ ~ 1, 15~ ··· i3)63·· · · 2)88 2. ••a"···---- 29······ 496 . 
50 24 4 --- 22 36 36 ---- ---- ------
12 ••••....•• 9 3 ···- --- ····--· ---·····---···· ·--······· ····------ --
31 6 9 1 15 14 ······ - . 
2~ ~ ······-ij·-··- 1 .:::::::_:::::::·:·::::::::·:::::::::::: ::::::·:: ___ :::_ 
3, 720 2, 357 73 80 1, 210 576 463 74 29 10 
20 I 9 ' 6 ·······--········-·····------·········------ ___ _ 
12, 452 72 4, 395 182 7, 803 830 260 263 299 8 
10 ········-· 8 2 - ------·-- ·-····· · ······-·······-------------- --------
30 21 7 2 -·-··············--··············------------·- - ---- -
s, 6~ 1~ ·----·ui· ~~ ···T977······ isi······-ioil _______ si·::::::::~:-- - 11 
4, 079 1, 807 155 68 2, 049 123 9 61 35 18 
14 ····-····· 11 3 ·······--· 4 •• •••••••• 4 ···-···-- -- -- ---
36 a _______ ____ 1 21 - --------··· ···· ·--··········· · ··----- -----------
7,013 769 144 13 6, 087 203 62 ··--- ----- 141 ·- --
38 ··••••···• 28 -------.------------ 8 ······-··· 8 ·····-· 
29, 446 349 Z, 491 279 26, 327 I, 222 li4 160 686 12 
~: . ----i i" 1: ~ -------~~------···f::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:·--------j 
5.1 13 11 12 Z2 19 ·············-················ 19 
~ ~ ....... 5. 1·······27-:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
64 6 14 34 10 4 ·-········-···-····· 4 -------- --
1 Deplftdlftts of om ploy- po1d from opproprlated funds. Data for Alosko , Hawah and U.S. terntorios exclude dependents of U.S. citizen civilian employees who ore permoMftt res1denh and who 
are employod In tho Stott or territory of lheir residence. 
APPENDIX C 
WortdwkN tote!.. 
United Stotts ..• 
Aluko. 
~~h':,~11 48 Stotu end DistriCt of 
Columble.. _ 
U.S. territories 
Guam _ •••• 
Midwoy tslood _ 
Panan11 c;,nal Zone .•• _ 
Puertollilo . _ 
Waloe lolaod 
DEP"RTMENT OF DEFEI~SE 
CIVILI"N P£RSOflNEL BY COUNTRY, AS Of DEC. 31, 1972 
Department of Defense "'my Navy Air force 
DuKt hue lnd1rtct DuKt hire l nd~rect 01rtct hHe lnduect Duect hire lnduect 
Toto! hue h1re h1..- ---- hue 
tiYIIjen us Fore1gn fore• an us. Fore•an forettn u.s. forelan fore• an u.s. forei11n foreian 
personnel cit1zens nationals nationals clhuns nthonals nat1onals cttlzens nationals nationals citizens nationals nationals 
1, 189, 030 1, 012, 380 69, 322 107, 328 364, 164 34, 820 77, 709 3t9, oeo 20, 761 11, 178 260, 809 13, 363 18, 392 
977,971 977, 971 ---
---- ==;;=-=-:;:. ~ 
310, 728 - 252, 925 • 346, 358 
----------------- ------ ----------5, 465 5, 465 • 
19, 888 19, 888 
952, 618=9=52='=61=8=~ 
12, 7!)() 9, 080 I 3, 670 
' · 840 57 
4, 646 
3, 199 
8 
4, 576 
57 -
1, 243 
3,196 
8 
264 
3, 403 • 
3 • 
2, 602 • 
5, 793 • 
337, 963 
1, 737 
828 
~ 
2, 372 -
2, 372 
157 
10, 722 . 
299, 849 
5,163-
3, 759 
33 
159 
1, 212 
2, 684 . 
3, 285 
--·------- .... 
246, 956 
-=- .. ::· 
560 2, 096 706 -
249 - 814 15 
2~ . 
308 182 691 -
3 1, 068 ---
8 - -- --- - -----
OSC JCS 
anti othe r 
defense 
act1v1t1es 
68,774 
67, 9GO 
22 
88 
67,850 
I 116 
106 
7 
25, 329 165, 652 •107, 328 16, 069 32, 448 77, 709 ·Foreian coontrieo llld or _ ____ •.... . 198, 309 1:698 
Alahanillan •....•••••.... _______ ----:3:-__ -_-__ -_-__ -_-_----::3-.-_-__ -_-_-__ -_-__ -_-__ -_-_--_____________ _:_ __ __;_ __ _:_ __ _:_ __ _:.:.:_:_:~--~ 
3, 169 20,201 11, 178 5, 788 12,657 18,392 
Araentlnl •. --······--··--······ 3J~ 2~ 12 .••.•••••• I . · ··-r::::::::.: ·· ··· · 2 ·:::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Austrofla....................... 289 •• ····························-··-····· Z5 288 ··-······· 2 ·······-············ 
Austr;. . ···············-----·-· 6 2 4 • • • •• • ••• • 5 
ma~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ =~2~ :0~ ~6 ------~r~~4-:_-:_:_:_:_:_~_~_::_~: ~~~~ ~3--: :~:~~::~8:::_- :_:_::_:_;~; :_;_; :::: ~;~:::~:~: ~~Hm~~~~~~~~~~~~um~m~~~ ~~L :=: ::: ~i 
Bol1voa......................... _ ___ 9 
Brazof.......................... ss 16 39 •.•..••••• 6 16 .......... ·····T ······-2·=::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::· .: zo 
Bulaarla. ················------ 3 I 2 ---··············-······ · ···················· ·······························-···-· ············· • 3 
Burma •• --------------- - -...... 4 1 3 ................. ...... .................... •• ----------------··- ------------------------ ____ _____ 1\ 
Cambodia •• ·---------------- . 7 I 6 __ •••••..•••.•••.••••••••..•••..•.••• .'... 7 
Canada (lnclud1n1 Newfoundland). 951 135 816 . ·-·············· 4 . ------·· l8······· 12L::::::::~----·--48··--·-·66L::::::::: 33 
Chod.. •••••...•••••.• ...••.••• 1 •••••••••• 1 •• ·-····-···-········ •..•.....•..• ·················-···············--·· ·············-· 1 
g~~~~bla·:::::::::::::::::::::: ~~ ! ~~ ·-· - ·· ---·--· 1· 6 -----------· ·····-··-········--·-····-·············---------···· - 11 • • • - ······-·· • ···············-··- ·······-·· ··· -···----·-····-·-·· 7 
Costa R•c•······ · ··--· · ··-· ··--· I , 1~ 2531 d _··_ ·.-.. ·.--·.-.. -.-.. -.··.·.-.. · ........ ~ .. -.· . ··.·.·.·.·.-.·.··· _ .... __ ....... ....................... . 2 Cuba. • • -·····-··········· 
1 
253 877 •....•..••...........••.•..•• ::::::::·· __ 
Cyprus .••.. -----············-· ·-········ I . .. . 
j~Ji~;t~,; ... ;~~ \\ ~ :3.:7i 2,!1 4:1i4~ : ~ ~ l ;~2 ,1'3,: :~~ : ~ llllllllll \:: ::, 11: 1\ ~llllll: lllll ~ ~~~ ~~' ~llllllll: 
France.. ........... ............... . . 7 2 2 
Germany __ ···-···· -···----··· 73,437 11,013 39 62, 385 9, 734 32 54,449 ··· 12·::::::::::-·-- · ·55· 1,188 ::::::::::-·· 1:m 
FooLnotes at end ot table. 
I 
3 
7 
4 
5 
2 
2 
6 
13 
96 
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APPENDIX e-:tontinued 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE- Continued 
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BY COUNTRY, AS OF DEC.·31, 197Z-Continued 
Department of [)efense Anny Navy 
Direct hire Indirect Direct hire Indirect Direct hire 
Total 'hire- hire-
civilian U.S. Foreign foreign u.s. Foreign forelrn u.s. Foreign 
per.;onnel citizens nationals nat1onals citizens nationals nationals citizens nationals 
Ju~y 25, 1973 
Air Force 
Indirect Direct hire Indirect OSD-JCS 
hire- hire- and other 
foreign U.S. Foreign foreign defens~ 
nationals citizens nationals nations activities 
foreirn countries and areas-Continued 
Ghana.······-·········-··-·-·--
Greece (including Creta) .....•...• 
Guatemala ________ .•• -- __ -------Haiti_ ________ _________________ _ 
Honduras ___ ---- ___ : ____ --------
Hona Kin&----------------------
Hungary ....... _. _ .......... __ . _ 
Iceland _______ ------------------
India. _____ ---- ____ -------- ----
Indonesia. ___ ---- __ ------------Iran _______________________ ___ _ 
Ireland ....•............ ·-·-·-·-
Israel (including Jerusalem).··-·-
Italy (including Sicily and Sar-
dinia) •.•• --------------------
Ivory Coast.. .......•........•. . 
Jamaica. __ -- __ -----------------Japan ________ _________________ _ 
Jordan.------------------------
laos --------------------------lebanon _____ • _______ -----------
L .. ward Islands ........•......•. 
liberia ..••......•... ··--·-·-··. 
luJ:emboura. ___ ----------------
Malagasy Republic~· ······------­
MalaWI. •...•.....••••...•.••••• 
Malaya, States oi.. ... ------·-·--
Malta ..•.......•............... 
Marshall Islands ............... . MeJ:ico ________________________ _ 
Morocco ... ------------ .. -------
~:r:!;.-;rid•: ::::::::::::::::::: 
New Zealand ........ • . •.. . ... . •. 
Hicara&UI-------- ---- --------.-
- Nfkeria ........................ . 
Norway ••.......•.............. 
Pakistan ••..•...•.•.••..... . •. . 
Panama _________ ------------ -- -
Paraguay ...•....•.............. 
~m.;j,r.;e;::: ::::: ::::::::::::: 
Poland ........................ . 
Portugal (induding Azores) ...... . 
Rumania . ______ ----_-----------
Saudi Arabia ...•.......•........ 
Senegal ....................... . 
Seychelles Islands .............. . 
Singapore. ____ . ___________ -----
South AtriCJ, Republic ol.. ...... . 
South Korea ...•.•.............• 
South Vietnam.··-·········-···· 
Spain (includin& Balearic Islands). 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) .••........... 
Swaden ...........••........ ... 
Switzerland ..... _ ... _ .• _ ... _ ... _ 
Taiwan .•. •••.•...•.•.•.....•.•• 
Islands: 
Thailand ••....•....•••..••.•... 
Trin_l~ad and Tobaao ....•.......• 
TU('IISII ________________________ _ 
~~r~el"Arib.lii.>ulilic.(fay·p-1):: ::: 
Unilad Kinadom .•.. .•... ........ 
~~~\u(~oviii i.inloii)::: :::::::::: 
Venezuela .......•.•.•.•..... --· 
Yugoslavia .................• •••• 
lalre (Congo) ..•.....•.......... 
Undistributed ••••••••••••••••••• 
I ----···-~- ~ ----········-········-·--··-··-·---···- ··-······-···-··-············-·················-············· I 
611 132 43 436 61 37 Z 24 ··----·-·· 92 4Z --·-·--··· 342 11 
7 I 6 -·---·-·---·--······ 4 - ·-·-··---·--·-···------·····- ·-······-······· ·-···--·-··-···- ········ 3 
I --·----··- I -------·-·--·---·--·--·--··-··--···-·-···········-··--- --·····-··-·· -····-···-··-····----····-···· ·- I 
6 z 4 ---·----·-·--------- 3 -···-·········-·-···-···········-·····-··-··-···-·-···----·-·-···· ···· 3 
13 --·-····-- 13 -·-·-----·------·--·--··---·-·-······-----···· ·-·-···--·-·-··-····---··-····-·-·-····-···-·········- 13 4 1 3 ····------·-·-·--·-·-····-·-······--························-·-·····-···-·-·····--········--·-······ 4 
703 134 569 -·---··-·-·----···-····-·-···-····------ 128 ~50 -·······-· 19 ·····-·············· 
21 I 20 ···--·--·····-···········-······-····-·- I 7 ········-··········- 6 .••.•...•• 7 
31 4 27 ·------·-- 3 -·-------·---··-·-·- I Zl -·-·····-·-·-·-·-·-·-···-···-···-·····-· 6 
202 21 181 ----·----- 16 176 -·-···---·-·-·-·---·--·-·····--·-·-··--- I -··-····-·-·····--·· 9 I _________ _ 
I -·-·-·-· - ·----·--···-·-·---···--·-·-···-·--··-······-···············-············-·-···-····-·····-· 1 
4 I · 3 ·--··-····-·-·-··-·····-·-·-·-····-·····-·······-···-······-·-·······-- 1 ················-·-· 3 
3, Z41 ·-----~~~- ' Z, 4~ :::::::::: •••••• ~~-----~:~~~-:::::::::: •••••. ~:~ .....•. ~~~.:::::::::: ....••. ~: ••.••• ~~-:::: :::::: 1~ 
I ---------- I -··--··-···-····-·····-··········-················ ··-· ········· ·····-·····-·· ·-·-·-·········-······· 1 
I 45,020 5, 581 1, 4Z4 38,015 2, 124 72 18,871 I , 063 I, 344 10,398 Z, 381 .......... 8, 734 33 
i ------·T i ::::::::::::::::::~ :::::: :::~:: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: · · ··-· · ·; · :::::::::: ~ 
1t --------~-------· ii·:::::::::::::: :::::: ··· · ·- ·-s·: ::::::::: ........ ~ .:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ·· ··--·· s· ::::::::: :· · · · · · · ·· i 
14 14 -------··-···-·-·-·· 14 -·-··-·····················-·····-···-··········-···--·····-···-·-·-·-·-····--·· ·········· 
I ---··--·-· I ··--·----·----·----·····--·· ··-···-···-········--·····----·········--····-···-···---···---·-·-······ 1 
1 ---------- I -·-------·------·---·-----···················-···-------·-·-·····-··-············-···-···--··--···-- 1 
2 I I ·----·-····----·--·-··-··-··-·-·······-········-···-·-·······-······ ······· ····-···-·---·------·-·-· 2 
1 ··-······- 1. ..... .... ................•..•.................••...••..•.•. ..•.... ... ....... .....•••.••••...... .•.. . I 
66 66 ···················· 66 ······· -····················· ···················· ····· · · · ·····-············ · · ·········· 
69~ 11t ~~ ······s72 ·······47 ····-··· -s-: :::::: ::: ·······s.~-·· · ·····i ... . ... sh :·:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~ 
41~ ··-···i36- ~ ..... 266 107 ·················21ir:::::.::::::::::::::::::::::·:· ... 27 ·: :::::::::···-···s.~ · ~ 
A ··-····T · l ::::::::::::::::::::······ r:::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~ 
4 ··-······· 4 ···················- 1 ····················-······ ·•···· .. .. . .. .. ...... 1 •·•••••··· 2 
69 31 38 ••••••• ••• 30 5 ••••••••.•••••••• •• ••• • .•.••.••.•..•.•.•..•.•.•.• 29 ....•..... 5 
21 Zl ... ... . • . ... . . . .. .. ........ .. . ... ..•. . . .. .... ..... 8 •. . . . .••• •• .• . • .• ••• 7 •••••••••• 6 
Z I I .••....•..•.•..••..• 1 ••........•...••..•.• .• ........•....•.•..............•.••..•..•••.••.. 1 
9 4 5 •···••·•·••··•·•·•·• 3 ················•·•·• ·•••·•·········· .... ············-··············· · 6 
16 6 10 ··-················· . 3 ·····························-········································ 13 
16,554 1,146 15,408 .........• 5 81 .......... 39Z 12,825 .........• 745 Z, 497 -········· 9 
8 3 5 ---·-·-·-·-·······-·····-······-········-··········-·······························-·-···----··--·-· 8 
1,136 Zl4 922 ···---·-·- 3 7 -····-··-· 93 32 .......... 111 879 -··-·-·-· · 5 
4 I 3 -···--·····-·········-·-·····-····-··--·-···-·····-·-···-·······-···············-···········-··--··- 4 
3Z 11 21 ------···- I 16 ........................... ,............ 10 4 ·········- 1 
I··-·· · -·-- ~--··-·-·-·····-···································-· ·-··················-·····-·-···-····-··---·-··- I 
I I ··-···-·---·-···-·-· I --··-··-··-······--··-·········-············-········-·······-·-······-·----·-····- ······· 
42 20 Z2 ··-·-·-·-·-···-···-·--····-·-·-·····-··· 12 , 15 ···-·····- 8 3 -·----·-·· 4 
5 -·-·-· · --- 5 -·-···-·········-·····-·······--········-··········-···············-···········-····-········-·-·--· 5 
16,885 1,130 12,111 3,644 850 10,724 3,644 93 241 .......... 180 1,142 ·--······· II 
18,103 571 17,532 -·-··-···· 426 16, 456 -··--·-··· 98 352 ·······-·. 24 713 --···-·-·- 34 
Z, 600 744 1,1165 --·---···· 408 59 ·-·-···-·- 146 I, 071 ·-······-- 183 730 ··-·-··-·· 12 
I .......... I ----·-···--·-·-·-·--··---···-·-···················-·············---·····-····---·--·-···-·--·-·-··-· I 
7 z 5 ---··--··-····--····-·--····---··-··-···-···· ·················-···-·-·-·-·-·····-·-·-····-····-·-·-· 7 
5 - 3 2 ··-···-···-·---·-···-·-·····-·-·-·-·-···-·-·············-·········-···-···-·····-···-········-···' · · 5 
I, 934 254 1,680 •....•... . · 65 205 -·-······· 69 6-45 •........• 115 825 ••..••.•. : 10 
7,020 266 6,727 27 105 2, 444 .......... 69 257 .......... 83 4,013 .......... 49 
I I --·-····· '···-··--·-···-···············-··-······· I -·-················-··· ······-····-·-···-··--·--····-······· 
6 z 4 -····-·-·- 2 3 -·····-·····-·····:············-·······-·· ········-··· ··-·--·-·-····-· 
996 379 617 ···-·---·- Z59 115 --··············· · ···-········ ········-·- 120 498 -··-·-·--· 4 
106 4 102 ··-·········-······ ······ · ...•.. :....... 4 102 ····························-·-··················. 
3, 553 1, Z49 796 1, 506 713 479 66 113 309 61 412 •..•... ... I, 381 19 
10 I 9 ····-··--···-······· 5 ···························-··········-········-·······-············· · 5 
16 4 IZ ·····-·····-··-·-········· ····-·····--··-··-·······-·-·-·-·····-···········-···-······-·····-······- 16 
13 5 8 -·-··-···- I 3 -·-·-·-·-·-·- ··············-···········-···············-········-·-··· 9 
4 1 3 -·--··············· ····-··-·········-···--····· ····-·-···--······-···-·-···-···-··· ········--······- 4 
9 I 8 ··-·-·-·-· I 6 ·-·-·················-··········-···-··-·--··········-··········-···-- 2 
117 100 17 -··--·-··- 67 ······-······ ······· 3 ········-···-·-····- 30 17 -· · ················· 
•Includes 32 and 346 Direct Hire Foreign Nationals of OSD and Other Defense Activities in terri- • Includes 49 Indirect Hire Foreian Nationals of Other Defense Activities. 
!Dries and forei&n countries respeotively. • Includes civilians located in the Ryukyus. 
APPENDIX 0 
NATO 'AND SOME NATO SEGMENTS' TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.S.R.-1951- lZ 
(In millions of dollars( 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1-!156 19~7 1958 1959 1960 1961 
NATO t total exports I with Eastern Europe •. ... 515.7 522.4 551.1 769.3 887. 5 I, 159.9 1, 303.7 I, 368.1 I, 497.8 I, 925.3 I, 896.9 NATO total Imports with Eastern Europe _______ 753.8 695.8 681.7 829.5- I, 101.6 I, 279.4 I, 410. Z I, 450. Z 1, 69Z. 2 I, 978.0 2, 089. 7 NATO total exports with U.S.S.R .............. 129.0 184.1 164.6 237. z 243.5 415.3 412.3 444.7 418.0 67Z.8 761. 1 NATO total imports with U.S.S.R .......•.•...• 283.2 294.4 240.4 308.5 407. 8 452.0 463. 9 53Z. 6 67Z.Z 876.4 989.3 U.S. total exports with Eastern Europe .•..•...• Z.8 1.1 1.8 6.1 7. 0 II. Z 86.Z 113. 3 89.3 193.4 133.4 U.S. total imports with Eastern [uropa ......••• 63.8 39.6 36.4 42.4 56.0 65.5 61.3 62.6 80.9 81.0 81.1 U.S. total exports with U.S.S.R .••..•.•.•.•••.. .I (•l J:~ .z .3 3.8 3.6 3.4 7: 4 39.3 45.6 U.S. total importJ with U.S.S.R ..••••••••.••••• %7.4 16. ll. 9 17.1 24.5 16:5 17.5 Z8. 6 22.6 Z3. 2 
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1962 
European NATO total exports with Eastern 
Europe.. • . . .•. • ••. • ••••.•..•••••• 512.3 
Europnn HI'.TO total imports with Eastern 
Europe _ • .• • ............ 683.6 
European NATO totale.ports with U.S.S.R..... 128.9 
European NATO totaltmports with U.S.S.R.. ... 255.3 
NATO total exports wtth Eastern Europe ••••. • 
HATO tolaltmports wtth Eastern Europe ...... . 
NATO total exports Wtlh U.S.S.R ....... .. . . 
NATO total imports wtth U.S.S.R ............. . 
U.S total exports wtth Eastern Europe .. ...... . 
U.S. total Imports with Eastern Europe ........ . 
U.S. total exports with U.S.S.R ............ ... . 
U.S total Imports With U.S.S.R . . ............ .. 
European NATO total exports with Eastern 
Europe .• •.. _.-- - - --- ____ ---- - --- - - - -- -
European NATO total imports with Eastern 
Europe .. ............................. . 
European NATO total exports with U.S.S:R .... .. 
European NATO total Imports with U.S.S.R .... . 
'All NATO member countries. 
1 East European Communist countnes. 
I Trade date with Alblnlo ucluded. 
1962 
2, 144.6 
2, 214.7 
751.9 
1, 043.5 
125.1 
78.9 
20.1 
16.2 
I, 974.0 
2, 120. I 
735.7 
1, 025.6 
• Preliminary. 
• Greece end Turkey trode ~mputod at 1971 levels. 
'lnslanlflcont amount. 
APPENDIX E 
RECORD OF PLENARY Mu:T!NO OF THE PREPARA-
TORY CONSULTATIONS HELD IN VIENNA ON 
MONDAY MAT 1-l, 1973 AT 10:30 A.M. 
Chairman (Mr. J . A. THOMSON). We have 
gathered to resolve the question or pe.rtlcipa-
tlon and procedures. In this connection we, 
as I understand, are to hea,r nine points and 
tour statements. 
Mr. 0. N. KBI.uTov. 1. Representatlv• o1 
the folloWing states a.re the p&rtlclpants In 
the preparatory consultations related to Cen-
tral Europe which began In Vienna on Janu-
ary 31, 1973: 
The Kingdom of Belgium 
The People's Republic of Bulgaria Canada 
The Czechoelovalt Soctallst Republic 
The Kingdom of Denmark 
The German Democratic Republic 
-rpe Federal Republic of Germany 
The Kingdom or Greece 
The Hungarian People's Republic 
The ltaltan Republic 
The Orand Duchy of Luxembourg 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
The Kingdom of Norway 
The Poll.sh People's Republic 
The Soclaltat Republic of Romania 
The Bepubllc of Turkey 
The Union o1 Soviet Socialist Republica 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
The United States of America. 
ll. Representatives or the following atatee, 
which are potential participants In posalble 
agreements related to central Europe, wUJ 
take the necessary decisions by conseDBua: 
The Kingdom of Belgium 
Canada 
The Ozechoelovalt Socialist 'Republic 
The German Democratic Republic 
The Federal Republc or Germany 
The Orand Duchy ot Luxembourg 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
The Polish People's Bepubllc 
The Union of Soviet Soc1allst Republica 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern lrelanct 
Tlae United States o1 America 
If another state wishes to be Included 
among the •tatee ll.sted In thl.s paragraph and 
thl.s Is agreect by conaemua of the repreaenta-
tlvee of the •tates ltated In this para.graph, It 
may be 80 Included. Such lncl\llilonln nego-
'lationa or decl.slons related to Central Eu-
rope could either be general or, 11 so agreed, 
could be for the Umlted purpoee of taking 
part In a particular decision or dec1slona re-
la~ to thla subject. It Ia uncteratood that 
•uch 114dltlonal parilolpation In decl.slona, 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 11969 11970 •1971 "1972 
520.7 5-48. 8 757.2 869. 1 1, 083. 6 1,186. 2 I, 231.6 I, 371. 1 1, 695.1 I, 669.8 
648.8 640.4 783.1 I, 040.7 I, 203. 9 I, 338.4 1, 3n.6 I, 598.9 1, 883. 7 1, 992. 9 
184.1 164.6 232.0 240.5 386.5 397.2 421.8 397.3 625.0 691.3 
279.2 228.7 295.9 390.1 426.5 544.5 513.4 641.2 850.5 968.4 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 •1969 •1970 • 1971 I 4 1972 
2, 258. 5 2, 835. 7 2, 779. 7 3, 397. 0 3, 667. 5 3, 956.1 4, 436. 3 5, 194.9 5, 712.3 7, 477. 7 
2, 480. 0 2, 574. 0 3, 956.9 3, 449.1 3, 686. 6 3, 914.7 4, 340. 9 4, 948.8 5, 599.6 6, 609.3 
792.5 I, 023.7 826. I 925.8 I, 049. 8 I, 294.4 I, 415.2 I, 689.3 I, 738.2 2, 413.3 
953.8 918.7 I, 149. 9 I, 274. 4 I , 385. 0 I , 466. 0 I , 581.8 I, 724. 2 I, 860. 5 2, 066.9 
166. 4 339. I 139.4 !98. 0 195. 2 216. 8 249. 3 353. 3 384. 0 818.2 
80. 6 98. 8 137.4 178.6 177.1 198. 3 195. 1 225. 5 222.7 320.1 
22. 9 146. 4 44.4 4l7 60.2 57. 5 105.5 118. 4 161.8 546.7 
21.2 20.8 42.6 4~. 5 4ll 58. 1 51.5 72.3 57. 6 95.5 
I , 912. 6 2, 054. 2 2, 357. 9 2, 833. 5 3, 304 7 ~612. 3 4, 162. 3 4, 688. 6 5, 161.9 • 6, 308.4 
2, 380.5 2, 449. 8 2, 879. 0 3, 220. 6 3, 436. 8 3, 645. 4 4, 075. 6 4, 658. 7 5, 297. 6 6, 187.9 
630. 4 584. 5 598.8 587.6 870. 4 I, 154. I I, 399. 6 \ , 473. 7 I, 451.0 I , 801.8 
930.4 895.3 I, 098. 2 1, 214. 1 I , 322. 7 I, 387. 9 I , 518. 9 1, 648. 1 I, 790. 4 1, 956.0 
Note: Differences in the valuetion or trade appear in various statistical series. Their relative 
value In relation to the t6tals shown here, however, is insianificont in the process of abstractina 
trends from this summary tabla. 
Sources: Deportment of Commerce trade statisltco, OECO trade statisticS and assistance from 
~;~~~~~~ ~~~~hDeportment of Stole, ~EU. Oario Scuka, analyst in int~rnational trade and fi· 
a.greement:; , or measures would be without 
prejudice to the security of any of the par-
ties. 
8. The following states wUI participate with 
a special status: 
The People's Republic or Bulgarta 
The Kingdom of Denmark 
The Kingdom of Greece 
The Hungarian People's Republic 
The Italian Republlc 
The Kingdom of Norway 
The Soclallst Republic of Romania 
The Republlc of Turkey. 
4 . All pe.rtlclpanta wtll be seated as listed 
In p&ra.graph 3 according to the English ver-
sion. 
5. The chairmanship wUJ rotate from meet-
Ing to m~tlng among the representatives of 
the states listed In para.graph 2 ln the order 
set forth In the English version . The ftrst 
chairman wUl be drawn by lot. 
6 . All participants wUJ have the right to 
speak and to circulate papers on the subject 
matter. 
7. The meetings will be open only to the 
partlclpan ts. 
8. Following the opening statements, pro-
ceedings and documents or the meetings wUl 
be con11dentlal except for those matters on 
which It Is agreed In advance that another 
procedure wlll be followed . There wUI be no 
oftlclal recorda of meetings except as other-
wlae agreed. 
9. The omclal languages w1ll be Engltah, 
French, German, and Ruaatan. 
Mr. B. QuARLES VAN UFPOJU>. The represent-
atives or Belgium, Canada, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States of America wlah to point out that the 
arrangements tor the participation o1 Hun-
gary In these consultations are w1thout prej-
udice to the nature of Hungary's pe.rtlclpa-
tlon In future negotiations, decisions, or 
agreed measures or to the security of any 
party, and that, In partlcul&r, the question 
of how and to wbat extent Hungary will b& 
Included In future decisions, agreements, or 
measures must be examined and decided dur-
Ing the pending negotiations. 
Mr. E. USTOa. In connection w1th the uni-
lateral statement of the representatives of 
Belgium; Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America the representative of the Hungarian 
People's Republic wishes to state the follow-
Ing: 
All the repr-ntatlvee of Hungary anc1 or 
other aoolallat state. have explained during 
the course of the consultations, Hungary 
could consider participation In possible de-
cisions, agreements, or measures only U the 
appropriate conditions are fullilled . 
Mr. B. QuAaLES VAN UFPORD. It Ia under-
stood that the arrangement on participation 
nnd procedures being adopted today will also 
be applied In the forthcoming negotiations. 
Mr. 0. N. KHLESTOV. It Ia agreed that the 
arrangement on participation and procedures 
being adopted today will also be applied In 
the forthcoming negotiations. This does not 
preclude the poaalbUity of raising the ques-
tion of Inviting other European states to 
participate In these negottatlon.s as observers. 
Chairman (Mr. J. A. THOII4SON) . Are there 
any objections? 
I see none. 
It wUI be so recorded . 
TESTIMONY OF. DEPUTY SEC,JU;TARY HUSH. BE-
FORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CON-
TROL, JULY 25, 1973 
U .8 . TROOP LEVELS 1N EUROPE 
Mr Chairman : I welcome this opportunity 
to discuss with you the level of American 
forces In Western Europe. Since the United 
States signed the North Atlantic Treaty In 
1949, Congress has supported the continued 
presence of U.S. forces In Europe. I believe 
that there nre convincing reasons to conUnue 
that presence and to avoid unilateral cuts In 
our European troop atrengtb. I should like 
to dlsousa these with you today. 
Our forces in Europe serve several objec-
tives or U'.S. policy. In my remarks I wm ad-
dress each of these In some detaU. But at th e 
start I think It weuld be useful just to go 
over them. · 
First : Our European forces play an Im-
portant role In deterrence. Relations between 
East and West In Europe have not been 
smooth these past 25 years. But they have 
not come to military con1llct. It Ia our defen-
sive posture and the Incalculable conse-
quences of war tor an aggressor that have 
time and a.galn turned us back from war In 
Europe and toward negotiation. 
Second : U.S. forces In Europe make a slg-
nll!.cant contribution to defense. In the un-
llkely event of mllltary con1llct, they would 
poee a formidable l!.ghting torce. NATO's 
conventional strength-to which we make an 
Important contribution-must be capable of 
meeting a Warsaw Pact attack without early 
use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear strength 18 
not enough. 
Third: The presence of U.S. forces playa a 
vital political role In our relations with West-
ern Europe. It Ill the Tlsible evidence of our 
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commitment to NATO's security. OUr Aillee, 
conftden t of t h a t commitment, are maltlng 
slgnlftcant strides In assuming an lncreaalng 
share of the common defense burden. But 11 
we pu ll our troops out prematurely, tbat 
p roce!lB will be jeopardized. And the goal of 
a strong, u n ited Europe, sel!-rellant but 
closely allied to t he United States, may never 
be realized. 
Finally: Of special Interest to this sub-
committee Ia the role of our forces In Eaat-
West negotiations. We have made stgnlllcant 
progress In the past several years toward our 
goal of a s table and secure world at lower 
levels or cost and r isk to the United States-. 
SALT I , the Berlin Agreements, the VIetnam 
accords, new relations wit h Ohl.na--t>J.l tbese 
are tangible evidence or progress. But much 
remains to be done. We are engaged In the 
second phase ot SALT, In CSCE, In MBPR. 
To succeed In these negotiations, we cannot 
withdraw !rom the world. We cannot nego-
tiate !rom a posture or weakness and retreat. 
In my opinion, we should not consider uni-
lateral withdrawals of our troops from Eu-
rope when we are only 90 days away tram 
negotiations to lower these forces mutually. 
For the first time since the cold war began 
the Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate 
about a reduction of Its forces In the heart 
ot Europe. This Is a remarkable accompllsh-
ment--almoet unthinkable just a few years 
ago. 
There are good reasons !or believing that 
t he Soviets are entering these tali.B with 
serious Intent. But It Ia obvious that they 
will have no Incentive to negotiate with ua 
11 we cut our own troop s t rength unilaterally. 
The eSBence of negotiations Is that you must 
have something to give 1n order to get some-
thing you want. 
The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks are 
an example of this rule !amU!ar to all mem-
bers of this subco=lttee. Last year we 
reached agreement with the Soviet Union to 
llmtt otrenslve and defensive nuclear weap-
ons. · In that &il'eement we halted our on-
going ABM program, and In exchange the 
Sovie ts agreed to limit t heir own ABM de-
ployments and the further deployment of 
their giant 88-9 m !BBIIes. 
It we had followed the advice of some to 
give up the ABM prograw. unilaterally or to 
reduce our ol!'enslve strategic programs uni-
laterally, I do not believe there would have 
been a SALT agreement last year, let alone 
prOIIPecte far a follow-on agreement next 
year. 
This same natural logic applies to our 
forces In Europe. UnleSB we enter the force 
reduction negotiations this fall with our 
troop strength Intact, the Soviets will have 
no Incentive to bargain. And the process of 
normalization and reduced confrontation 1n 
which we have Invested so heavily over the 
past 25 years will be placed 1n jeopardy. 
As you well know, arms control discus-
sions can yield not only substantial military 
results but a continuing political discourse 
ot considerable value. In SALT, our candid 
dlscUSBions with the Soviet Union did much 
to dispel common misconceptions &lld to cre-
ate a new atmosphere of greater confidence 
and trust. That same posslbUlty lies before 
us In the mutual force reduction tali.B. Thus 
proponents of unilateral American tocce 
wlthdrawala would not only sacrifice the mil-
Itary benefits of negotiating Soviet force re-
ductions but also the slgnt.ncant poUtleal 
benefits of such negotiations. 
I have ~led to determine In my own mind 
why there Is such a s t rong urge at this par-
ticular time to reduce our forces unlla.terally. 
Part of the reuon Is clearly that after our 
long and frequently frustrating experience 
In VIetnam there 111 an understandable de-
eire to bring our forces home. But our prob-
lems and pollolas In Europe are clearly dlt-
ferent !rom th~ In Bouthellllt A.el.a. The 
stabUity 11114 proiPflrlty made pOIIlible by our 
poetwlll' commitment to Europe haft taucht 
us the wisdom of this commit men t. Any re-
duction In our force levels m ust take account 
ot this approach and not oome as reflex ac-
tion to our policies In some other part of the 
world. 
The VIetnam experience Is clearly not th e 
only reason tor the current disenchantment 
with our contribution to NATO. It seems to 
m e that the drive to cut our forces substan-
tially der ives In large m easure from some 
basic m isconceptions about current Interna-
tional realities. 
At the risk or over-slmpllllcatlon, let me 
brlefty lis t what I believe to be the major 
misconceptions : 
First, that with progreaa towards detente 
a strong defense Is no longer required. 
Second, that our balance of payments prob-
lems and preSB!ng domestic needs leave us 
no choice except to cut our forces kubstan-
tlally and unilaterally. 
Third, that our European allies are getting 
a tree ride by not malting a significant con-
tribution to the co=on defense, and 
Fourth, that our conventional forces are 
merely a symbolic "trip wire" and not a 
eerloua military machine, and that In any 
case they are unneceSB&ry as we can rely 
upon a nuclear deterrent. 
Let me deal with each ot these In turn: 
There are some who argue thAt In fact no 
mllltary threat In Europe exists, that prog-
re&a In moving towards detente removes the 
need tor a strong defense. 
The m111tary facta ot 111e provide no justl-
_flcatlon tor t h is point or view. Over the put 
de«_ade the Soviet Un!Dn lncreaaed. Its total 
mU!tary manpower by SO%, doubled Its pub-
lished mUitsry budget and vastly lncre.ased 
Its nuclear forces. 
WhUe the United 8tatee has decreased 
the number of Its toroes In Europe over the 
past decade by over one-third, the Soviet 
Union has since 1968 Inc~ the number 
of Its division !rom 26 to 81. In recent years 
we have observed an Increase In the num-
ber of Soviet tanks In eastern Europe, the 
Introduction of new a.lr defense mtsslles for 
the protectiOn or Soviet ground torcee, and 
an Increase In nuclear-capable rocket 
launchers and cannon artillery. Thu.a the 
military foroes posing a potential threat to 
NATO, rather than dlm1nlshlng, have sub-
stantially lncrea&ed both 1n qus.ntlty and 
quality. 
It the m111tary facta provide no justlllca-
tlon !or unilateral American withdrawals, do 
political realltlee :l>'nnlt 11uch a etep? We 
have made sub6tantlal prosresa In moving 
from an era of confronte.t4on to an era ot 
negotiations. Tensions In Europe have de-
clined. , 
But we have made this progress not by 
wishful thinking about our adveraar1ee nor 
by •bandonlng commitments to our allies. 
On the contrary, we have reduced tensions 
by demons ttatlng to our adveraartee that our 
continuing strength and determlnatlon lett 
them no alternative but to negotla.te. 
The progress we have made In recent 
years Is not Irreversible. In fact Europe's 
history glvee more grounds !or pessimism 
than optimism &bout t"e poeslbllitles tor a 
durable peaoe. Throughout a large part ot 
modern his tory, Europe hae been either pre-
paring !or, actually fighting or recovering 
!rom war. 
We do not believe that t his periodic recur-
rence ot war In Europe has to continue to 
be the case. But to change Europe's history 
we must understand the continuing reali-
ties of lnternat1onall11e. In President Nixon's 
words "War Is caused not by the strength of 
one nation alone b u t by the wealtness of 
one nation In :relation to another. suengtb 
and resolution are a~ Incentive tor nego-
tiation leading to peace. Weaknees s.nd naive 
sentimentality are an open Invitation to 
pl'e'38ure tactics and aggression leading to 
war." 
Some seem to believe that the western Eu-
ropeans are strong en<7118h to provide tor 
their own defense without a s!gnlllcan~ 
American presence. 
History refutes this contention. Twice In 
this century we have had to Intervene mili-
tarily In western Europe to protect freedom 
and our own security. 
It was our decision In 1949 to change 
cou rse and to maintain a tangible and sig-
nifican t defense commitment In western 
Europe which has made the past quarter 
of a century one of Europe's most stable and 
prosperous eras. This stability and pros-
perity have been of great benefit to us as 
well as to the Europeans. Why should we 
abandon such a successful policy? 
It Is simply fostering a misconception to 
t alk about our forces being In Europe for 
the defense or Europe alone. OUr contribu-
tion to NATO must be understood tor what 
It Is: a matter or U.S. sel!-lnterest. Western 
Europe Is the second greatest economic 
power In the world, linked to the United 
States by Innumerable strategic, political, 
cultural and economic ties. It Is American 
security which dicta tee the necessity to deter 
not only a full-seale Soviet attack on West-
em Europe but also the application of Soviet 
political preesurea--!or such preSBures could 
give the Soviets veto power over western 
European cooperation with the United 
States. 
There Is another dimension as well. A 
primary objective or Amerl.can foreign pol-
Icy this year Is to reinvigorate our relation-
ship with our Allies, and to establish a 
framework within which we can deal with 
pressing problems of trade, ftnanoe and se-
curity. 
We and our NATO a111es have been ablE>o 
to forge · a prosperous and dynamic world 
economy from the ruin of war because we 
worked together, not only to rebulld the 
world economy, but also to provide tor our 
common security. There can be no pros-
perity without security just as there can 
be no security without a sound economy. 
We cannot abandon cooperation In one 
sector without gravely damaging the other. 
It Is that knowledge which has always pro-
vided the common sense bounds to our d11-
ferences on any matter. 
That Is a reality that I hope you wUl take 
Into account as you consider propoeals to act 
unilaterally to reduce our contribution to 
the co=on de!en.ae. It would not be pru-
dent to assume that the good will and con-
structive effort that our Allies have brought 
to the solution ot our oo=on trade and 
monetary problems could be- quite the same 
11 our cooperation In our co=on defense 
had been eroded by substantial unilateral 
troop reductions. 
Let me turn now to another source of 
pressures for unilateral American reduc-
tions. We are all agreed that this country has 
a serious balance of payments problem and 
pressing domestic needs. But we have been 
moving vigorously on both these tt-onts and 
with considerable success. 
The results ot our monetary actions are 
beginning tq take el!'ect. We believe the cur-
r ency realignments provide the basts for 
elimination of the long-stanc11ng U .8. deftclt 
and restoration or International payments 
equilibrium. 
Department of Comm.erce data show a 
drop In our balance of payments deficit !rom 
$3.8 billion for the first quarter of 1972 to 
t1.2 hllllon this year. That Is a very Impres-
sive Improvement. 
Plainly the speed our return to equlllb-
rlu.m. and we can do so with economic poli-
cies which leave us with a slgnlftcant mlll-
ta.ry capability overaeaa. 
There Is considerable misunderstanding 
about tbe Impact our troops In Europe have 
upon both our balance ot payments and the 
federal budget. The result of our having 
800,000 men and their dependents In Europe 
1n PY 1972 was a payments deilo1t of tl.5 
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bllllon. That is, after subtracting the value 
or our military' exports and services to west-
ern Europe from the value of our m111ta.ry 
expenditures in western Europe, there wa.s a 
dllferenoe of •1.6 btlllon. This flgure ln-
cludes West German purchases of U.S. mUI-
tl'ry equipment tn !ultlllment of the us-
FRO olfset agreement. But It does not take 
into account this two billion dollar agree-
ment's assistance to our payments burden 
In the form of substantial West German 
purchases of U.S. Government securities 
and west German rehabllltatlon of U.S. 
mtlltary facUlties. 
Equally Important, the 1.& btlllon dollar 
figure must be looked at in the context of 
our overall balance of payments. It Is com-
parable, for example, to the $1.2 bllllon 
deficit caused by the larger number of 
American tourists visiting western Europe 
than western European tourists visiting the 
United States. And It was only a sixth of 
our total ba.slc payments deficit of over •9 
bllllon In 1972. 
Moreover, the deficit in the mllltary bal· 
ance of payments was not a major cause of 
our deteriorating balance of payments situa-
tion. The major problem was the Increasing-
ly a.c1verse balance In non-mlllta.ry gooc1s and 
service&. 
And whUe the decline In value of the 11ol-
lar Increases the cost of our troops abroa.c1, 
It has a more-.slgnltlcant and favorable im-
pact upon the competitiveness of our ex-
ports. Thus whtle the local coste of our troop 
deployments in Europe have Increased, thiS 
lnoreaae Is small compared to the favorable 
Impact the new exchanges rates are having 
on our $80 bUllon annual expf)rts of gooc1s 
a.nd servl~. It Is in this non-mUita.ry area 
where our inQreaslngly successful etrorts to 
reestablish payments equUibrtum must con-
tinue to be focu88ed. 
We have also been told that preaslng 11o-
meatl0 needa force us to cut our forces In 
Europe unUaterally. But surely this 18 a false 
choice. We always have ha.c1 'lilld always W1ll 
have both clotnestlc and national security 
need8. The point Is that we must devote 
a.c1equate reaources--ln a carefully balancel1 
way-to both. 
Let us look at the record. In 1968 almost 
one-half of the fel1eral budget went for 11e-
fenll8, whtle only a thlrc1 was 11evoted to hu-
man reaourcea. Today these proportions are 
reveraecl with human resources receiving half 
the fel1eral budget anl1 defense receiving leas 
than a thlrl1. 
In 1968 the 11e!ense budget was n1ne per-
cent ol GNP. It Ia now just s1x percent. 
Surely thla Ia not an unacceptable buroen 
for a oountry with a GNP of well over one 
trUllon clollara. 
Slnoe 1968 we have reduced the size of 
our armel1 forces !rom 3.6 mllllon to 2.3 mtl-
llon. Ancl In Europe over the paat deoa<1e, 
we have rel1uced our armel1 forces by a thlrl1, 
from 466,000 to 300,000. 
I believe that this Is a remarkable record 
of foroe reduction and cost control. It cer-
talnly demonstrates our oo=ltment to 
spenl1 no more of the nation's llmltecl re-
sources on clefense than Is absolutely necea-
ae.ry. 
Some seem to believe that by bringing our 
forces home from Europe we would not save 
money unle88 the forces that are returned 
home are 11emob1llzed. But our mutta.ry es-
tablishment today Ia alrea.c1y at Ita lowest 
level In two decades and tratts well behind 
those of the Soviet Unlon anl1 China. If we 
d.emobWze large numbers of our ste.ncllng 
forces, we cannot maintain our NATO com-
mitments or keep our pledges under the 
Nixon Doctrine. 
The bul1getary outlay for keeping our 300,-
000 men tn the European theater, anl1 that 
Includes the Mediterranean Sea, ·1a .4.0 btl-
lion for Flacal Year 1974. That Is the coet of 
pay e.nc1 maintenance of these men anl1 their 
11epenl1ente In Europe. 
However, If we . consider the cost of the 
support fa.cllltles in the Unlted States for 
these forces and the cost of their arms and 
equlpmlmt, the cost rises to .7.7 bUllon for 
Fiscal Year 1974. That Includes the $4.0 btl-
lion figure. 
Within these costs there Is an Incremental 
cost to the stationing of our forces In Europe 
additional to the coat of slmtlar forces in 
the United States. It rune to about $400 m11-
11on per year ami Is composed largely of such 
expenses as transportation. 
However, If you bring these men home and 
maintain our NATO co=ttment, you wUI 
have to keep them In uniform, and provide 
the a.c1ded transport and duplicate heavy 
artns In Europe so that they can be rapidly 
returned to fight there. In that case, the 
annual budget cost wm actually be more 
than at present. Thus, those whose aim Is 
reduced budget coste must be speaking not 
about unilateral reductions from Europe but 
rather about untlateral demobilization. This 
Administration rejects such an approach. 
You wm alao have heard the figure of 
•17 billion. That Is the coot of all the u.s. 
armed forces, wherever located In the world, 
that are committed to NATO and would be 
deployed In the evelllt of hostilities. It is not 
the cost of our troops now In Europe, nor 
would this amount be eaved even If we 
withdrew all of our forces from Europe. 
In sum, I hope you will agree with me that 
even substantial reductions of our forces 
In Europe W1ll neither save money nor re-
solve our balance of payments problems. 
Let me turn now to the role of our allies. 
We are urging our pa.rtnen In NATO to do 
more tor the co=on defense, but we by no 
means carry the entire burden. While the 
U.S. contribution Ia highly slgnVJ,cant, our 
allies contribute to NATO nearly 90 percent 
ot Its ground forces, 80 percent of Its sea-
power, and 75 percent or Its ~wer. In cen-
tral Europe, the allies supply 25 of the 29 
combat-ready divisions. They have over three 
mUllon men in aotlve service today--one 
third more than the United States has 
throughout the world. 
Perhaps most Important our NATO part-
ners have substantially Increased their de-
fense elfort In recent years. Since 1970 they 
have raised their defeil,le expenl11tures by 30 
percilnt to a level of •311 billion In 1973. 
Through the European Defense Improve-
ment Program they are !ulftlllng their com-
mitment to procure major new Items of mUI-
tary equipment anl1 to construct tnstella.-
tlons, In order to achieve a more etrectlve 
conventional defense. 
Our antes are also taking a number of 
steps to help the United States with both Its 
m1lltary balance or payments and budgetary 
problem.a. 
Ae I have already noted, the German Gov-
ernment, in addition to substantial arms 
purchases In the Unltel1 States, has also pur-
cha.eed $621 million In U.S. Government 
-medium term securities on which It pays the 
Interest and ha.s put $188 million into the 
rehabilitation or U.S. barracks In Germany, 
benefttlng both our J>alance of payments and 
our budget costs. The total value or this 
olfset agreement to the U .S. has been aP-
proximately $2 bUllon over a two-year 
period. 
We are now negotiating another olfset 
agreement wlth the Federal Republic. 
In addltlon, and important !or the long 
run, NATO's defense mln1Sters last month 
agreed to examine the problem of findllig 
additional multllateral means to reduce the 
adverse economic consequences borne by the 
United States as a result of Its stationing 
forces In Europe. We conelder this a major 
step that can reduce the balance of payments 
Impact and the Incremental bul1getary bur-
lien of stationing forces abroad rather than 
at home. 
Let me turn now to the fourth basic area 
of mlsui111erstandlng. Some argue that Amef-
lean and NATO forces are not a serious fight-
Ing 'force and could not withstand a Soviet 
assault. Thrls Is simply not true. NATO Is 
a formidable defensive force and not just 
e. "Trip wire" a.e some believe. In central 
Europe, for example, NATO has available 
roughly the same number of forces as the 
Warsaw Pact. And NATO Is now engaged In 
developing a further program of specific force 
Improvements that will ensure an adequate 
defense for the rest of this decade. 
But NATO could be forced Into a "trip 
wire" posture, In~ having to resort to nu-
clear weapons 1n a matter of days or even 
hours, If th.e United States were to unilater-
ally withdraw a substantial number of Its 
forces. 
This would be an extremely dangerous 
situation In today's world. The doctrine of 
"massive retaliation" bec&me Inadequate 
when the Soviet Union became a real nu-
clear power able tO retaliate In kind. That 
Is why l·t Is surprising to hear proposals to 
defend western Europe by depenl1ence upon 
nuclear weapons alone. This ba.ckdoor re-
vival of the doctrine of massive retaliation 
coincides with the emergence or something 
like parity In strategic weapons systems be-
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union. But nuclear parity makes massive 
retallatloa less bellevable as a means of de-
terring all forms of aggreBBion In Europe. 
The proposed return to this concept, whether 
tt Is ce.llel1 "masalve retaliation" or "trip 
wire", a.s a substitute for NATO's agreed 
flexible response capabllity reflects one or two 
things: either a. misunderstanding of the 
lmpllcatlone_of atra.teglo parity, or a cavalier 
dismissal of the poeslbU!ty of lese than all-
out war In Europe. 
Let me conclude. We are not asking the 
Congrese to agree that we should retain the 
present level of our forces l,n Europe indefi-
nitely. We are convinced that this Is neither 
wiSe nor neceBB&ry. 
But we are equally convinced that the 
manner In which we reduce these forces Is at 
least as Important a.e the reductions them-
selves. 
We want to bring a.bout these reductionS 
In a way which W1ll neither damage the At-
lantic Alliance nor tempt our adversaries to 
return to a policy of aggressive confrontation. 
As I have already noted, we are moving 
vigorously on three fronts: 
First, In NATO we are developing a multi-
lateral mechaniSm !or more equitable bur-
den-sharing and we are revising some basic 
defense cpncepts to allow for more efficient 
use of scarce defense resources. 
Second, In this Year of Europe we are 
seeking w re!iOlve the Inter-related Issues 
of trade, finance and security In a coopera-
tive and mutually beneficial manner, and 
Third, In allghtly more than 90 days we 
will begin unprecedented negotiations with 
the Soviet Union and the nations of eastern 
Europe to mutually reduce the forces st111 
confronting one another In the heart of 
Europe. 
Surely this Is a progra.m worth thls Con-
gress' most serious consideration. We ask 
only for the time to carry It out. _ 
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